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J.B. RUHL'S "LAW-AND-SOCIETY SYSTEM":
BURYING NORMS AND DEMOCRACY UNDER COMPLEXITY
THEORY'S FOUNDATION
JEFFREY RUDD*
INTRODUCTION
If we deny that there are foundations to serve as
common ground for adjudicating knowledge-claims,
the notion of the philosopher as guardian of
rationality seems endangered .... Holistic theories
seem to license everyone to construct his own little
whole-his own little paradigm, his own little
practice, his own little language-game-and then
crawl into it.'
In several related articles,2 Professor J. B. Ruhl addresses the
Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Montana; University of Wisconsin-
Madison, Land Resources Ph. D. Student (Entering Fall 2005); J.D., Washington
& Lee University School of Law (1986); B.S., Biology, Biochemistry minor,
Virginia Tech (2001); B.A., Philosophy, Virginia Tech (1983). The author thanks
University of Montana School of Law Professor Raymond Cross for providing
constructive comments on an earlier draft, Virginia Tech Science and
Technology Studies Professor Richard Burian and Virginia Tech Philosophy
Professor Joseph Pitt for challenging his Kantian inclinations, and the Editorial
Board of the William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review for its
diligence and professionalism in preparing the final manuscript for publication.
1 RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 317 (1979).
2 See generally J.B. Ruhl, The Co-Evolution of Sustainable Development and
Environmental Justice: Cooperation, Then Competition, Then Conflict, 9 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 161 passim (1999) (using complexity theory to analyze the
co-evolutionary system of sustainable development and environmental justice)
[hereinafter Ruhl, Co-Evolution]; J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm,
for the Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal
Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 passim
(1996) (using complexity theory to develop a general behavioral model of legal
system) [hereinafter Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm]; J.B. Ruhl,
Sustainable Development: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for Environmental
Law, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 31 (1999) (arguing that complexity theory's
optimization algorithms should be used to guide sustainable development policy)
[hereinafter Ruhl, Sustainable Development]; J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law:
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problems plaguing the modern regulatory state by applying
complexity theory to the "sociolegal system"3 of environmental law
and regulation. He argues that complexity theory4 provides the
"unifying"5 principles necessary to explain the underlying structure
Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and its
Practical Meaning for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, (1996) (using
complexity theory to develop a general evolutionary model of the legal system)
[hereinafter Ruhl, The Fitness of Law]; J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental
Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean Up the Environment by
Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOus. L. REV. 933 passim (1997)
(arguing that environmental law and its subjects are complex adaptive systems)
[hereinafter Ruhl, Complex Adaptive System]; J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr.,
The Arrow of the Law in Modern Administrative States: Using Complexity
Theory to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning
of Law Poses to Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405 passim (1997) (using
complexity theory to describe the direction in which the behavioral and
evolutionary mechanics are leading the sociolegal system given its current
transient state) [hereinafter Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law]; J.B. Ruhl &
James Salzman, Mozart and the, Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory
Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757 passim (2003) (using
complexity theory to develop an explanatory model of the primary agent of
involuntary noncompliance-regulatory accretion) [hereinafter Ruhl &
Salzmann, Red Queen].
3 Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, passim.
4 Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 857 n.9.
Trying to understand how dynamical systems evolve into that
position of maximum sustainability is the focus of a branch of
dynamical systems theory known as complexity theory. The
message of complexity theory is that there is a 'sweet spot'in the
spectrum of different system structure possibilities that provides
the optimal blend of stability, simplicity, and adaptability
needed to sustain the system.
Id.; see also infra Part I.
' Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 894 (arguing that
"once [scientific] approximation no longer is good enough for the level of comfort
we seek in our answers to the big questions, all dynamical behavior cannot be
explained through these doctrines: Complexity theory represents an
advancement in science because it explains why that is so in a unified theory.")
(citation omitted); Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law, supra note 2, at 419
(asserting that complexity theory has identified
properties of change that are common to many forms of
dynamical systems. These properties can be grouped under
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and evolution of the sociolegal system.' He describes the loosely-
defined "law-and-society system"7 within a framework premised
upon complexity theory's concepts.' His explanation for the
problems plaguing the environmental regulatory structure
assumes that the law-and-society system is a "complex adaptive
system"9 and complexity theory should be used to produce the best
strategies for regulatory reform. °
several broad headings: (1) description of the behavior of the
system according to the community of its components; (2)
description of the mechanics of evolution in the system and the
coevolution of that process with change taking place in
surrounding, interconnected systems; and (3) description of the
direction of change in terms of overall system behavior and
success-the system's arrow.).
6See Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 854 (building a
model of the "law-and-society system" through illustration of "the lexicon of the
scientific theorems that can be used by analogy to describe phenomena of that
system").
Dynamical systems do have governing meta-principles; it's just
that we will never find them by slicing up the system into
smaller parts. Indeed, it is the most sustainable of systems that
present the biggest challenge of that regard, for we know that
an essential quality of systems that make it into the complex
region is that they depend on some level of system coupling,
which itself is contra-reductionist, and they sit poised on the
edge of chaos, which defies prediction. American legal theory
and institutions have not learned those features yet, but must
do so eventually if we wish to understand and confront the
dynamical qualities of the law-and-society system and swim
back to the region of complexity.
Id. at 893; see also infra Part I.
' Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2 at 852.
8 See id. at 868 n.37 (noting that complexity theory"owes its origins in large part
to the study of how physical systems respond to external sources of disturbances,
such as turbulence factors in fluid flows, an area of research that has advanced
significantly with the benefit of a greater understanding of chaos behavior")
(citation omitted).
9 Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law, supra note 2, at 416 (positing "that law
can be usefully modeled as a complex adaptive system"); see also infra Part I.A.
10 See infra Part I.
20051 553
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'y REV. [Vol. 29:551
Ruhl's approach includes formulating a "theory of law"" that
explains the behavior of legal systems 12 and provides a
"nonideological, nonnormative basis" 3 for environmental re-
gulatory reform. He strives to develop a coherent system of
environmental law that will successfully adapt to the complexity
underlying all phenomena. 4 Complexity theory is the answer to
misguided regulatory traditions rooted in "reductionism. "
5
Ruhl astutely notes that relevant government organizations
and environmental laws need to become more adaptive and
resilient in the face of constant environmental change. He also
proposes several noteworthy reforms to the current regulatory
system, but he justifies his proposals with complexity theory's
unifying principles. The unifying approach buries environmental
regulations' essential normative character beneath complexity
theory's scientific elegance. Ruhl overlooks the epistemological
limits and the normative shortcomings of all-encompassing
theories, glossing over important differences between America's
law-and-society system and complex physical systems. The
theoretical analysis of environmental regulations as an "undiffe-
rentiated whole"'" undermines efforts to alleviate problems and
justify regulatory reform proposals.
This Article critiques Ruhl's application of complexity theory
to the system of environmental law and regulation. It argues that
the unifying strategy is theoretically and practically untenable,
producing a worldview at odds with understandings of human-
ity, normative judgments, and democracy. " Unifying theories
1 Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 854-55.
12 Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law, supra note 2, at 416; Ruhl, Complexity
Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 855.
13 Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1488.
14 See Ruhl, Complex Adaptive System, supra note 2, at 942-43, 968; Ruhl, The
Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1488-90; Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law,
supra note 2, at 416; Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at
857; see also infra Part I.
15 Ruhl, Complex Adaptive System, supra note 2, at 968; see also infra Part I.A.
16 CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 71 (1990).
17 See infra Part II.
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seductively play on human imagination and the desire for
Utopia-or at least a world with a bit less uncertainty. The
sociolegal version of complexity theory promises the impossible-a
unifying link between the structures underlying physical systems,
such as ecosystems, and the structures underlying the behavior
and evolution of law."8 Ruhl mistakenly argues that the law-and-
society system, social systems, and physical systems mirror one
another in a fundamental sense-that they may all be explained
as complex adaptive systems. 9 He contends that we must "think
as a complex adaptive system" to grasp the underlying, complex
adaptive character of the environmental regulatory system.2"
Part I of this Article introduces Ruhl's basic complexity theory
concepts and his explanations of the environmental regulatory
system. The discussion illustrates Ruhl's use of complexity theory's
unifying principles to explain the behavior, evolution, and
structure of the regulatory system. Part II demonstrates that
complexity theory's concepts do not satisfactorily "translate"
21
regulatory system phenomena into "an analogical model of law and
society as a unified dynamical system."22 It explains the theoretical
limitations precluding reasonable application of complexity theory
to a non-physical system from three distinct, but related,
perspectives. First, it shows that the model does not "conform"21 to
reality; humans are sacrificed for an illusion of conceptual
coherence.24 Second, it examines the argument that complexity
theory should be used to evaluate the "fitness" or "success" of a
law,25 and the consequences of that position for concepts of liberty
is See infra Parts I-II.
19 See infra Part I.
20 Ruhl, Complex Adaptive System, supra note 2, at 980.
21 See Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 862; see also
infra note 47.
22 Id. at 855-56 n.7.
23 See HELEN LONGINO, THE FATE OF KNOWLEDGE 117 (2001) (arguing that
conformation is an improvement over classical truth "where degree and respects
fall away. [Conformation] avoids the crudity of binary evaluation, and hence
avoids one of the problems attributed to true or false.") [hereinafter LONGINO,
FATE OF KNOWLEDGE].
24 See infra Part II.A.
25 Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1451; see infra Parts I.A.3, II.B.
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and democracy. The reconceptualization of laws as "species" and
democracy as "neo-Darwinian sex" is fundamentally flawed;
complexity theory's "explanatory power" does not reasonably
account for political liberty or democracy.26 Third, it discusses
Ruhl's application of complexity theory to sustainable development
policies and practices. The practical context further illustrates that
the unifying approach produces unacceptable epistemic and
normative ramifications for regulatory reform strategies.
Part III reviews several of Ruhl's reform proposals noting the
need to release them from their complexity theory justifications.
The theory's unifying principles undercut the wisdom of Ruhl's
laudable reform proposals." He convincingly argues that agencies'
political power should be significantly curtailed by Congress, for
example, by shifting the burden of proof in judicial proceedings to
agencies. Congress should also become more proactive in
environmental matters critical to advancing the public's interests;
agencies' legislative functions are misguided. Ruhl's proposals for
environmental regulatory reform easily shed their complexity
theory rationale in favor of democratic and constitutional justi-
fications.
Society should give up the unproductive pursuit of unifying
theories purporting to explain the underlying structure of
environmental law, policy, and regulation, and focus instead on the
particular regulations and agency decision-making processes
impeding the resolution of environmental conflicts. Practical
solutions to regulatory problems develop in context, not through
philosophical holism justified by "unifying" theories. Foun-
dationalist 28 theories will never "screen off' 29 uncertainty or
eliminate normative influences from regulatory decisions.
2' Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1417 (using "the development of
environmental law to provide an example of the explanatory power of the
Complexity Theory paradigm for the sociolegal system"). See generally id.
27 See infra Parts II-IL.
21 "Foundationalists seek to identify what can serve as basic grounds in
justification (i.e., grounds that themselves do not require justification)."
LONGINO, FATE OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 23, at 81.
29 See generally NANCY CARTWRIGHT, THE DAPPLED WORLD: A STUDY OF THE
BOUNDARIES OF SCIENCE 107-10 (1999) (discussing "screening off" and its role in
building probabilistic causal models).
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Democratic principles should guide efforts to improve the quality
of the environmental regulatory system and its decision-making
organizations. The hopeless endeavor of searching for "unifying"
principles diverts valuable time and energy away from a
productive, democratic renaissance in environmental law and
regulation. "The answer to the defects of democracy is not denial
of the democratic idea."
30
I. J.B. RUHL'S "UNIFYING" THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
REGULATION
The application of complexity theory to the law-and-society
system is necessarily complicated. Part I reviews Ruhl's use of
complexity theory's basic concepts and principles to describe and
explain the sociolegal system, before turning to his application of
the theory to the environmental regulatory system. Complexity
theory's fundamentals must be digested to understand its severe
epistemic and normative consequences for environmental law and
policy.
A. Applying Complexity Theory to the Law-and-Society System
Ruhl explains the behavior 3 and evolution 32 of the socio-
legal system 33 in terms of complexity34 theory,35 while targeting the
30 FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC & ITS GOVERNMENT 128-29 (1930).
31 See Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, passim; Ruhl,
Complex Adaptive System, supra note 2, passim.
32 See Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, passim; Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The
Arrow of the Law, supra note 2, passim.
33 Certainly anything that improves our understanding of how the
environment works, as many scientists believe complexity
theory has done, should also improve our ability in the long run
to manage the environmental consequences of social activity.
But my focus is not exclusively on nature's dynamical
environmental system; rather, we must also consider the
dynamical forces within the legal system we devise to manage
our impacts on the environment. Law, in other words, has the
capacity to operate as a complex adaptive system.
Ruhl, Complex Adaptive System, supra note 2, at 937-38 (citation omitted).
34 See Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law, supra note 2, at 410-11 n.6.
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law-and-society system's structure for comprehensive, fundamental
reform. 6 Traditional, reductionist approaches to legal theory and
Unfortunately, 'complex' is the best term to use to describe both
the structure and the behavior of many nonlinear dynamical
systems. When referring to structure, complexity generally
means many system components, complicated organizations,
intricate details, and so on. When: referring to behavior,
complexity generally is associated with adaptive and robust
sustainability of the system. The distinction is crucial for.., a
simply structured system could behave complexly, and a
complexly structured system could behave simply.
Id.
See Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 857 n.9.
Although the familiar label for dynamical systems theory is
chaos theory, in fact what is known as complexity theory more
fully captures the whole picture of dynamical systems behavior
than the scientific research has revealed.... Dynamical systems
theory is developing, and there is not complete agreement in the
scientific literature as to its lexicon or meaning.... [Dlynamical
systems theory has been developing as fast as advancements in
computers allow, and complexity theory represents its most
advanced model.
Id. (citation omitted).
36 See Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1418-19.
The centralized federal regulatory state, [is] ... impeding the
adaptiveness of the American sociolegal system. With
Complexity Theory as a foundation, I make the case that it may
be time for a long jump out of those outmoded structures and
towards a more adaptive system which may be realized through
greater reliance on common law and other nonfederal
initiatives.
Id.
[W] e should reexamine the schemata and structures of our laws.
To the extent they are premised on the need for centralized
federal administrative control and that need has been reduced
or eliminated, laws based on those premises may not be fit for
much longer. . . . Solutions not permitted in the federal
domination scheme may prove more fit, but we are hindered
from reaching them while stuck in the local landscape of the
administrative state and trying as hard as we might to keep it
from changing below our feet. We need, in other words, to
evolve, and to do so expeditiously through long jumps to new
schemata and structures.
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reform are self-defeating, "causing us to focus on attempting to
achieve absolute system predictability by adopting an increas-
ingly complicated architecture of rules and organizations."'"
Reductionist views"8 fail to account for the chaos,
39 catastrophe, 40
Id. at 1486.
Law and society interact together, and can be thought of as
doing so in a nonlinear dynamical manner. The law-and-society
system model in this sense exhibits qualities similar to those
which scientists have observed in other natural and social
systems. For legal theory and legal institutions to ignore the
findings of dynamical systems theory, therefore, is to remain
ignorant of the underlying qualities and evolution of the law-
and-society system model ....
I have also taken a risk . . .and posited the first steps for
reforming the system toward nonreductionist structures
intended to carry the law-and-society system toward the region
of dynamical complexity.
Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 927.
In general, therefore, those making laws must alter their focus
from reductionist, problem- specific approaches to system-level
approaches. They must also recognize that the complexity of
legal structure itself is often the cause of social problems. Both
structurally and philosophically, therefore, self-critical measures
can be taken to stem the tide of increasing legal structure before
social collapse does so instead.
Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law, supra note 2, at 475.
17 Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 859-60.
38 When reductionism has prevailed, it has prevented that insight
from becoming an organizing principle of study because
reductionism is premised largely on five extremely intuitive, but
false, principles:
1. Small, gradual changes in causes give rise to small,
gradual changes in effects.
2. Deterministic rules of behavior give rise to completely
predictable events.
3. All real-world truths are the logical outcome of following a
set of rules.
4. Complicated systems can always be understood by
breaking them down into simpler parts.
5. Surprising behavior results only from complicated, hard-
to-understand interactions among a system's component
parts.
2005] 559
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and emergence4 ' phenomena characterizing complex adaptive
Id. at 893-94 (citing JOHN L. CASTI, COMPLEXIFICATION (1994)). "These are the
subheadings for the second through sixth chapters from Casti's book on
complexity theory." Id. at 895 n.116.
9 "Chaos occurs when the deterministic rules of the system produce seemingly
random system behavior." Id. at 856. "That is chaos: sensitive dependence on
initial conditions in a system dictated by simple, deterministic rules produces
what appears to be highly complicated, random system behavior. Chaos, in that
sense, is 'order masquerading as randomness,' and it is the unmistakable
fingerprint of a strange attractor." Id. (quoting JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS 22 (1987)).
"The rules determining the presence of chaos may be simple, but the organizing
structure of the overall system, known technically as the system's 'fractal curve,'
is not at all simple." Id. (citing PETER COVENEY & ROGER HIGHFIELD, THE ARROW
OF TIME 362 (1990)). "Thus, chaos 'only looks complicated because you don't know
what the rule is.'" Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 867-
77. (quoting JACK COHEN & IAN STEWART, THE COLLAPSE OF CHAOS 197 (1994)).
40 "Catastrophe occurs when a system suffers a discontinuity that radically shifts
the location and trajectory of the system." Id. at 856.
That is catastrophe: a sudden qualitative change in a dynamical
system brought about by a continuous change in a system
variable. Catastrophe disturbances change the attractors of the
dynamical system, and "it may take only the tiniest of changes
to trigger the switch." The two subtle features of catastrophe
thus are that large changes in behavior can result from
arbitrarily small changes in conditions, and that after the
system crosses the catastrophe point it may land near or on a
previously unfamiliar, or perhaps even unknown, attractor.
Id. at 878 (quoting COHEN & STEWART supra note 39, at 212) (emphasis in
original).
41 "Emergence is characterized by changes in the system's trajectory as a result
of the self-organized patterns of interaction between the system's components."
Id. at 856.
That is emergence: the appearance of unforeseen qualities from
the self-organizing interaction of large numbers ofobjects, which
cannot be understood through study of any one of the objects.
The key to emergence is understanding that the emergent
behaviors of dynamical systems are "high-level patterns arising
from the indescribably complex interaction of lower-level
subsystems." Hence, removing or otherwise changing any
interacting component of the system potentially changes the
entire system since the interactions leading to the global
emergent behaviors may no longer be possible. The presence or
560
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systems, unintentionally threatening the system with "social
collapse."42 The backdrop of scientific reductionism led to a
regulatory structure that precludes constructive, systemic
change.43 Regulatory reform must produce a revolutionary,
decentralized law-and-society system" designed to enhance
adaptability and avoid reductionist tendencies.45
not of emergence thus depends on the condition of the system as
a whole.
Id. at 877-78 (quoting COHEN & STEWART, supra note 39, at 397) (emphasis in
original).
42 Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law, supra note 2, at 475, 467-69 (providing
a general discussion of social collapse).
[CIlassical American legal theory and legal institutions, like
classical science, are based on the reductionist tenet that
through ever finer decompositions of the system we can discover
the system's governing meta-principles. Chaos, emergence, and
catastrophe do not lend themselves to analysis through such
dissection, and thus are "an enormous problem for
reductionism."
Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 893 (quoting COHEN
& STEWART, supra note 39, at 191).
" See id. at 859-60 (arguing that "hyperdetailed regulation and ingrained
reliance on top-heavy administrative structures have buried the more
fundamental legal structures-the first principles-so deep that we no longer
can explain, much less predict, how the law-and-society system will respond to
a new socio-legal challenge"); Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law, supra note
2, at 860.
44 The unifying theme of [complexity theory] is that it is not just
the rules of the system that matter but the entire system
structure. Hence, legal reform directed at the goals of increasing
system adaptability must focus on working with the complete
law-and-society system, not on just tinkering with laws.
Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 889-90; cf RORTY,
supra note 1, at 315-16 (arguing that "[tihe notion that there is permanent
neutral framework whose 'structure' philosophy can display is the notion that
the objects to be confronted by the mind, or the rules which constrain inquiry,
are common to all discourse, or at least to every discourse on a given topic").
45 [P]erhaps more so in law than in any other field of humanities
does a culture of reductionism doom the system, for only in the
law-and-society system do the system components [i.e., humans]
get to write the rules and decide whether to obey them. When
those rules-society's laws-are written, studied, and evaluated
2005] 561
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1. An Overview of the Sociolegal Model
Ruhl contends that complexity theory applies to the sociolegal
system and other non-physical domains through an analogical
model.46 He experiments with the "observational form of
[complexity theory] ... through application to an analogical model
of law and society as a unified dynamical system."47 Following in
from a predominantly reductionist perspective, we inevitably
are befuddled when the dynamical system surprises produced by
chaos, emergence, and catastrophe occur. Fighting those
phenomena with more reductionist approaches leads us only
further into the abyss.
Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 859.
46 Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law, supra note 2, at 436-37 (' The general
model of system change offered by complexity theory fits the sociolegal system.
Whether that fit is direct or simply one of analogy, the model provides a new and
powerful analytical tool for assessing the process of sociolegal evolution."); Ruhl,
Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 862 ("Dynamical systems
theory provides a lexicon . . . [that] can easily be used through analogy to
describe a model for the interaction of law and society.") (citation omitted); Ruhl,
The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1417 ('The Complexity Theory fitness
landscape paradigm is simply a powerful way of explaining dynamical system
evolution generally. Indeed, law and society being, as I analogize, in a dynamical
system relationship, the concept of an evolving fitness regime for the sociolegal
system seems worth exploring."); see also Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a
Paradigm, supra note 2, at 862 n.19.
As Geu points out, at least one legal commentator has suggested
direct applicability of dynamical systems theory to the law-and-
society system, whereas [Geu] prefers to leave it as a
metaphorical relationship. . . . I am not convinced the
relationship is one of direct applicability or simple metaphor,
and thus I choose to describe it as analogical.
Id. (citing Thomas E. Geu, The Tao of Jurisprudence: Chaos, Brain Science,
Synchronicity, and the Law, 61 TENN. L. REV. 933, 935 (1994)); Ruhl, Complex
Adaptive System, supra note 2, at 944.
It may be too soon to tell whether complexity theory represents
a scientific revolution in the Kuhnian sense, but it is not too
soon to say that complexity theory, despite its detractors, has
pushed its way into the forefront of research in virtually every
field of physical and social science.
Id. (citations omitted).
" Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 855-56 n.7.
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the footsteps of researchers in other disciplines," Ruhl applies
complexity theory concepts to describe the law-and-society
system. 9
The interaction of law, society, and the real world
environment in which that system is embedded can
be described through analogy to a nonlinear
dynamical system. The playing space 51 is the full
socio-legal dimension-that is, anything that has to
do with the interaction of law and society as broadly
as we wish to define those two domains. The rules of
motion5 ' are laws themselves, on the law side, and
social mores and ethics, on the society side. The
initial state,52 at its most distant, was when society
first emerged, but for purposes of this study, it is
whenever we want to begin examining the effect of a
new rule of motion on the system. The trajectory53 is
the rate and direction of the historical socio-legal
evolution of the total system in phase space.54
41 See Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law, supra note 2, at 436-37 (noting that
"other disciplines embraced the model long before legal theorists have. They
have been using the model to make important findings about the fate of complex
structure and behavior in various settings, including proteins, immune systems,
brain circuits, economies, cultures, and ecosystems.") (citations omitted).
49 See Ruhl, Complex Adaptive System, supra note 2, at 954-67.
50 Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 863. "Each
dynamical system has an n-dimensional playing space, known technically as a
manifold or phase space, which contains all the possible system states." Id.
(citation omitted).
" "Each system also must have a set of rules of motion, known technically as
vector fields, which tell the system components where and how to go next from
wherever they are now." Id. at 863.
52 "The initial state, also known as the initial condition, consists of '[tihe
quantities (such as position and velocity) which must be specified at an initial
moment in time in order to predict subsequent behavior."' Id. at 863 n.23
(quoting COVENEY & HIGHFIELD, supra note 39, at 362).
" "Thus, '[a]s the system evolves in time it maps out a trajectory in the phase
space.'" Id. at 863 n.22 (quoting COVENEY & HIGHFIELD, supra note 39, at 364).
54 Id. at 867.
As do all such dynamical systems, the analogical law-and-society
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The complex "system's behavior is defined by the number and
character of [the system's] attractors."5 5
system model has a multi-dimensional playing field, or "space,"
within which the system dynamics occur; it is governed by a
nonfinite set of rules prescribing the system's trajectory, and
that trajectory is hurtling among basins of influence defined by
the system's "attractors."
Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 854.
[Pihase space is not simply the four-dimension space-time space
that we observe in the physical world, but rather an n-
dimensional playing field, with n being all the relevant variables
of system operation, within which the instantaneous state of the
system is a single point representing the concurrently instanta-
neous values of all the variables of the system.
Id. at 862-63 n.21 (citations omitted).
55 Id. at 863. "Find the attractors and you will understand the system as much
as current science allows, for while any point in the playing space can define the
system's behavior for the very short term, in the long term 'the only possible
behaviors are the attractors themselves."' Id. at 864 (quoting JAMES GLEICK,
CHAOS 138 (1987)). "[In dynamical systems theory parlance there are three
types of attractors of relevance to this discussion: fixed point, limit cycle, and
strange. Each type of attractor corresponds to a type of dynamical system
behavior pattern." Id. at 863-64 (citations omitted).
One type of behavior would be represented by a trajectory
moving towards a fixed point in the plotting space. This is
known as a fixed point attractor system exhibiting stable steady
state behavior in which all of its variables stop changing (stasis)
once it is on the attractor. In a more complicated type of
behavior, the system, once on the attractor, exhibits a cyclical,
trajectory repeatedly visiting some fixed set of points. This is
known as a limit cycle attractor system exhibiting stable
periodic behavior. In the third type of behavior, the system's
trajectory would be plotted as a tangled web buzzing around the
surface of its attractor in a never-repeating, never-crossing,
aperiodic trajectory. This is known as a strange attractor system
exhibiting chaotic behavior. Strange attractors are a core subject
matter of complexity theory.
Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law, supra note 2, at 419-20. "An attractor is
simply a model representation of the potential long term behavior of the system,
a useful concept for exploring different kinds of long-term behavior." Id. at 419
n.27 (citing COVENEY & HIGHFIELD, supra note 39, at 360). "The attractor is not
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The law-and-society system's adaptive state (which optimizes
"balance'56 among the attractors) is threatened by the current
system's reductionist structure.5 7 The system structure needs to be
adjusted to enhance "the degree to which the system exhibits
complexity and thus the ability to adapt."58 The law-and-society
system optimizes "sustainability" when the attractors' influence
moves the system closer to the chaotic state without sacrificing the
system's order.59 The complex system's resulting "state" describes
the relation of the attractors when sustainability is achieved.6"
2. "The Complicating Factor of Human Free Will"6'
Ruhl argues that the sociolegal model illustrates how the
system's rules of motion-its laws-behave given a system
component's-a human's-potential exercise of free will.62 When
applied to physical systems, complexity theory allows researchers
a force of attraction or a goal-oriented presence in the system, but simply depicts
where the system is headed based on the rules of motion in the system." Id.
(citing COHEN & STEWART, supra note 39, at 206-07). See generally id. at 420-26
(discussing the relationship between attractors and chaos, emergence, and
catastrophe and the adaptive system concepts' analogical relation to law).
5 6 See Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1442 ("When a 'community' of
fixed and strange attractors is assembled in the proper balance, therefore, the
forces of order and disorder combine to allow the system to operate at optimal
adaptability, that is, to operate as what is known as a Complex Adaptive
System.") (citation omitted); Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note
2, at 890 n. 108 ("By balance I do not mean equilibrium in the familiar sense of
stasis, which would be the result of a system defined exclusively by a fixed point
attractor. Complex systems-sitting on the edge of chaos-are far from that sort
of equilibrium.").
17 Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 890-91; see also
supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
5 Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 889-90, 928.
9 Id. at 890.
60 id.
61 Id. at 855.
62 See id. at 867-68.
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to build computer models describing the rules of motion governing
components' behaviors.6 Human components, however, present
unique problems that Ruhl classifies under "free will."' "Humans
are not that accommodating, and attempting to 'program' or
'model' their exercise of discretion requires more of dynamical
systems theory than science may ever have to offer."65
Ruhl contends that human free will "eliminates [the]
possibility of... a stationary model."66 Free will can, however, help
explore the application of complexity theory to the law-and-society
system model.67 He uses "free will as the parameter for defining
the system's law attractors,"6' asking "when confronted by the
potential for exercise of free will ... how does the law side of the
law-and-society system behave?"69
Ruhl posits that on the law side of the sociolegal system,
freedoms,7 ° rights,7 ' and regulations72 are important attractors
defining how the system uses laws to address "the complicating
factor of human free will."73 The Supreme Court's decision in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council provides insight into the
relationship among law, the law attractors,
74 and free will.7
63 Id. at 867 (noting that " [w] hen a mathematician programs a dynamical system
into a computer model, the components obey the rules as given"); see also supra
notes 49-55.
64 Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 867.
65 Id.
6 6 Id. at 867-68.
67 Id. at 868.
6 8 Id.
6 9 
Id.
70 Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 873-74 (stating that
"[fireedom is a person's ability to act without restriction in accord with his own
subjective free will in the absence of any countervailing right or regulation").
"' Id. ("A right is the ability, enforced by society, of one person to constrain
another's freedom in the absence of direct governmental intervention.").
72 Id. ("A regulation is society's direct intervention with respect to exercise of a
freedom, regardless of the exercise of any one individual's rights.").
73 Id. at 855. "Humans pose a complication for the model in the form of free will."
Id. at 867 (citation omitted).
74 See supra notes 70-72.
75 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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The Lucas decision 6 illuminates the new meanings traditional
legal concepts acquire in the law-and-society system.7
The result is that the freedoms to use property as one
wishes are limited by the rights others have to
recover in nuisance and the ability of the government
to duplicate the effect of those rights through direct
regulations. If one could "map" the locations of
freedoms, rights, and regulations in the law-and-
society system's playing space, the regulatory takings
doctrine as a law value would be on the law-and-
society system's trajectory somewhere between these
three attractors.78
Law resolves the free will dilemma "through the balance of
freedoms, rights, and regulations.
76 Ruhl quotes the following section from the Lucas opinion:
We believe . . . confiscatory regulations, i.e., regulations that
prohibit all economically beneficial use of land ... cannot be
newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must
inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background
principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already
place upon land ownership. A law or decree with such an effect
must, in other words, do no more than duplicate the result that
could have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners
(or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of
private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary
power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or
otherwise.
Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 869 (quoting Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1027).
77 Id. at 870.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 874-75.
Hence, although it may not always manifest itself as neatly as
it did in Lucas, law contributes to the resolution of issues of free
will in a law-and-society system-contract disputes, gender
discrimination, environmental pollution, or whatever
else-through the balance of freedoms, rights, and regula-
tions. Those are the law-and-society system's attractors for
determining the mix of law-based mechanisms for managing the
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3. The "Nonideological, Nonnormative Basis" ° for Regulatory
Reform
Complexity theory's improved version of evolutionary theory8
provides the conceptual foundation for Ruhl's attempt to develop
a "nonideological, nonnormative basis" for regulatory change. 2 He
describes change in the law as a mechanical process" occurring
complications posed by human freedom of will.
Id.
80 Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1488.
81 See id. at 1416. "The real feat of Complexity Theory, however, is in
accommodating the competing order and chaos themes of evolutionary biology
in one unified theory." Id. "[T]he fitness landscape model of Complexity Theory,
by unifying the uphill march of natural selection with the downhill error
catastrophe made possible by species selection, begins to adjust the neo-
Darwinian theoretical features to the reality of evolution." Id. at 1453; see also
Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law, supra note 2, at 418.
One of complexity theory's most striking developments has been
identifying properties of change that are common to many forms
of dynamical systems. These properties can be grouped under
several broad headings: (1) description of the behavior of the
system according to the community of its components; (2)
description of the mechanics of evolution in the system and the
coevolution of that process with change taking place in
surrounding; interconnected systems; and (3) description of the
direction of change in terms of overall system behavior and
success-the system's arrow.
Id.
82 See Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1488; Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The
Arrow of Law, supra note 2, at 416 (arguing that complexity theory provides the
foundation to build "a coherent model of law's process of change").
8 See Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1449. "Complexity Theory uses
the metaphor of a topographic landscape to describe the mechanics of dynamical
system evolution and the resulting fitness of a species relative to its
environment." Id. (citation omitted); see also Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of
Law, supra note 2, at 434. "As complexity theory develops deeper understan-
dings of the mechanics of fitness landscapes and system coevolution, perhaps the
dynamics of legal evolution will be better understood as well." Id. See generally
Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1448-56 (discussing the mechanics of
the evolving environmental law); Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law, supra
note 2, at 429-34 (discussing the mechanics of coevolution of systems by
illustration of the "fitness landscape metaphor").
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dynamically and interdependently through the co-evolution of the
"law" and "society" subcomponents within the law-and-society
system. 4 Law's evolution is not described solely in terms of the
rules of motion-"laws ... on the law side, and social mores and
ethics, on the society side,"85 nor exclusively as an incremental
historical process resulting primarily from normative choices.86
Evolutionary explanations relying upon a historical discussion of
human choices "fail to convey an essential characteristic of the
process-law can only move in one direction along its path of
change."" Ruhl relies upon the unifying power of complexity
theory to describe law's evolution "not as movement along a
gradual, straight, up-hill slope, but over a topography of fitness
peaks, valleys, and planes-a fitness landscape." 8
Individual laws are analogous to organisms within complexity
theory's improved explanation of Neo-Darwinian evolution.89 Law's
success is a function of "fitness."0 "Fitness of laws, just as for
84 See Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1437-67; Ruhl, Complexity
Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 854; Ruhl, Co-Evolution, supra note 2,
at 166.
Two key co-evolutionary design properties of such [complex]
systems are (1) their focus on multi-trait optimization goals
rather than single-trait maximization goals and (2) the mix of
cooperation, competition, and conflict they adopt in their
adaptive, evolutionary decision-making strategies. These pro-
perties define how complex adaptive systems, including legal
systems, will seek to maintain fitness in their environments,
and how successful they will be at doing so.
Id.
85 Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 867; see also supra
notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
6 See Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1448-54; Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The
Arrow of Law, supra note 2, at 414-17.
87 Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law, supra note 2, at 415-16 (arguing that
"[wihen society wants to change the direction of law, it can make a sharp turn
towards the path that might have been, but it can not retrace its steps. The path
of the law is a one-way street; it has an arrow.").
88 Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1416 (citation omitted); see also id.
at 1453-58; Ruhl, Sustainable Development, supra note 2, at 45.
89 See Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1453; see also id. at 1437-57.
90 Id. at 1451; see also id. at 1449-50 (explaining that "[miost biological defi-
nitions of species fitness involve some measure of a species' propensity to
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species, is measured in terms of how successful the law is in
meeting its goals .... A law is fit if it achieves its policy."9'
Complexity theory provides a view of the law-and-society system
that permits the assessment of a law's success independently of
other (e.g., normative) evaluation methods.92
The point, of course, is that the fitness of a
normatively undesirable law-a law the policy for
which no longer is (or perhaps never was) one we
wish to pursue in the sociolegal system-may lead us
to consider the need for modifying or repealing the
law more immediately and more thoroughly .... 93
B. Applying Complexity Theory to Environmental Law
Environmental law provides an important opportunity for the
application of the complexity theory to the law-and-society system
model.94
Environmental law, as much as any component of the
law-and-society system, has witnessed a flux and
struggle in the system's movement between free-
doms, rights, and regulations as to which has been
contribute offspring. The whole point of evolutionary theory is determining
whether such fitness changes with variations in the behavior and structure of
the organism, and if so, in what direction and to what degree.") (citation
omitted).
9' Id. at 1451; see also id. (stating that "[t]he goals of laws are those expressed
as the motivation for legislative enactment or judicial decision-what we might
call the law's policy").
92 Id. (arguing that "it is crucial that we disaggregate questions of fitness from
questions of desirability in law, for it is important to know as an independent
matter whether a law is or is not successful in fulfilling its goals on a sustainable
basis").
" Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1451-52.
94 See Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law, supra note 2, at 460 (noting that "the
story of environmental law is the story of society increasing legal structure to
solve problems, but facing diminishing returns along the way").
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and will be the dominant attractor.95 Describing a
law-and-society system through analogy to the
lexicon of dynamical systems theory allows us to
understand better how the system chooses from these
various instruments for implementing socio-legal
structures.96
Ruhl develops three themes tojustify the application of complexity
theory to the environmental law system.97 First, many of the
subjects of environmental law (Ruhl outlines, for example,
ecosystems,98 technology,99 economies,' 0 and land use 1 ) consist
of "interlinked complex adaptive systems."' 2  Second, the
environmental law system does not account for the adaptive
9 Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 855 n.6.
As Professor William H. Rodgers, Jr. states: "The catchword for
the study of environmental law is complexity .... The field
presents an ongoing kaleidoscope of tussling organizations,
interests, jurisdictions, and states where strategies, goals and
outcomes are subject to constant redefinition." This complicated,
evolving quality of environmental law, plus environmental law's
intricate connection to changing social perceptions, make it a
prime candidate for nonlinear dynamical systems theory. To the
extent environmental law is in this respect more 'unstable' than
other fields of law, lessons dynamical systems theory teaches us
about environmental law provide all the more value to the
general thesis of how we go about promoting sustainability of
the law-and-society system.
Id. (quoting WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw § 1.2,24-25 (1994));
see also Ruhl, Co-Evolution, supra note 2, at 171 (arguing that environmental
law "must" be designed "as a complex adaptive system") (citation omitted).
96 Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 855; see also id. at
880-86 (describing "Chaos, Emergence, and Catastrophe as . . . Powerful
Descriptive Tools for Legal Theory" through environmental law case studies).
" Ruhl, Complex Adaptive System, supra note 2, at 939, 941.
98 Id. at 954.
99 Id. at 958.
100 Id. at 962.
101 Id. at 964.
102Id. at 939; see also Ruhl, Complex Adaptive System, supra note 2, at 980-9 1.
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complexity characterizing its subject matter. 3 Consequently, the
regulatory apparatus is unable to effectively respond to environ-
mental challenges; "it is mired in a reductionist, linear, predictivist
mentality ignorant of underlying complex system behaviors." 104
Third, regulatory "deregulation" and incremental regulatory
"reinvention" models are fundamentally inadequate to cure the
incoherence and inconsistency permeating environmental law;
these models "are misguided responses based on outdated
conceptions of law and society that conceal the complex adaptive
nature of the legal system." "'
In order for environmental law to function well as a complex
adaptive system, it should include five behavioral design fea-
tures: "[a]ggregation,"106 "[filows,"' 07 "[n] onlinearity,"'0 ,,[dli-
versity,"109 and "[sielf criticality."110 In theory, principles of
"aggregation" or "emergent collective behavior""' explain how the
system's decision-making processes achieve positive, adaptive
"°SId. at 940. "[TIhe second theme.., is that our present framework of environ-
mental law is designed as if its subject matter is dictated by uniformitarianism
rather than a set of dynamic, adaptive systems." Id. (citation omitted); see also
id. at 980.
'4 Id. at 940-41.
'0 5Id. at 941; see also Ruhl, Complex Adaptive System, supra note 2, at 980.
Law is one of society's problem-solving mechanisms. As complex
adaptive systems research has demonstrated . . . it is very
difficult to solve problems in such systems unless you think like
a complex adaptive system. I posit, therefore, that the
environmental law we use to address the problems of the future
in environmental quality must itself incorporate the qualities of
its subject matter-in other words, we must think of
environmental law as a complex adaptive system.
Id.
1
06 Id. at 981.
107 Id. at 983.
108 Id. at 986.
109 Id. at 989.
110 Ruhl, Complex Adaptive System, supra note 2, at 990.
111 Id. at 945.
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results by maximizing the number of decision-making components
("patches""12) and enhancing the degree to which they are "in-
tertwined, or 'coupled.""' 3 New information "flows" informing the
sociolegal system's decisions should be patterned after the
"market," which is "highly adaptive and open ended-the difficulty
is not in our inventing it, but in our not getting in its way."" In
contrast with such an adaptive system model, Ruhl contends that
the modern administrative state's reductionist organization, linear
perspective, and predictivist purpose "has managed to clog the
information flow pipes .... 11 The sociolegal system's design
should also reflect that disturbance is necessary to create
"diversity," fostering learning and long-term system adapta-
bility.
116
The new system design must overcome agencies' tendencies to
rely upon a linear, "quantitative-based command-and-control
model."117 "Nonlinearity" characterizes the behavior of system
components oscillating between "deterministic randomness," or
112 See Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1474 (explaining that
"[p] atchiness refers to the degree of dispersal of lawmaking power, and coupling
refers to the degree of interrelatedness between the units into which that power
is dispersed").
... Ruhl, Complex Adaptive System, supra note 2, at 945; see also Ruhl, The
Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1469 (arguing that
the basic idea of patch procedure is simple: take a hard, conflict-
laden task in which many parts interact, and divide it into a
quilt of nonoverlapping patches. Try to optimize within each
patch. As this occurs, the couplings between parts in two
patches across patch boundaries will mean that finding a 'good'
solution in one patch will change the problem to be solved by the
parts in adjacent patches.).
114 Ruhl, Complex Adaptive System, supra note 2, at 985, 984-86.
115 Id. at 984.
116 See id. at 990. "When the pendulum of disturbance stops, the breeding ground
of diversity runs dry. If we plant a stake in the ground and say that is where
environmental law will stick, even if we are supremely pleased with where it is
at the moment, we have at that point stopped learning." Id.; see also infra notes
118-26 and accompanying text.
117 Ruhl, Complex Adaptive System, supra note 2, at 988.
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chaos, and order."' The subjects of environmental law function as
complex adaptive systems," 9 but the command and control model's
poor design precludes reasonable policy choices. 2 ° The sociolegal
system must incorporate nonlinear features to open the door for
flexible experimentation with environmental policy and regula-
tions. 12' Finally, self criticality requires the ongoing reevaluation
of the complex design attributes addressing issues of aggregation,
flows, nonlinearity, and diversity. 22 Ruhl suggests that the five
system design features'23 "should be the guiding principles of
environmental law."'24 He argues that in the absence of structural
change, the command and control model's reductionist features
will inhibit learning and curb system adaptability.'25 "[F]or the
environmental law system to be adaptive, it has to learn ...
Learning in a management context, when the subject matter itself
is complex and adaptive, requires sustained creative interfer-
ence-events that tilt the apple cart-and a willingness to treat
the logic of yesterday as 'a disposable expedient.""26 Furthermore,
the failure to design the regulatory structure by "think[ing] of
1 8 Id. at 946-47.
119 See id. at 943. "The subject matter of environmental law, in other words,
consists of complex adaptive systems, and hence it behooves environmental
policy decision makers to examine what the science of complex adaptive systems
has to say about how such systems behave, evolve, and co-evolve." Id.
120 See id. at 968.
[B]oth the present structure of the law as well as the most
touted proposed reforms display an amazing degree of ignorance
of complex adaptive system dynamics. The underlying tradition
of environmental law ... is based on a conception of nature as
uniformitarian, a nature in which change takes place, but in the
form of trends that are capable of extrapolation and prediction
which lead toward an ordered state of equilibrium. We know
that this paradigm is a fiction; so why does our legal framework
cling to it?
Id.
121 Ruhl, Complex Adaptive System, supra note 2, at 987-88.
122 Id. at 990-91.
123 See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
124 Ruhl, Complex Adaptive System, supra note 2, at 991.
125 Id. at 988-89.
126 Id. at 989 (citation omitted).
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environmental law as a complex adaptive system"'27 will encourage
counter-productive rule accretion 2 ' and potential societal col-
lapse.129
C. "Regulatory Accretion"13
Although the sociolegal system took great strides in the 1970s
toward improved forms of environmental regulation, the sociolegal
system has failed to keep pace with an evolving culture,'3 ' leading
Ruhl to claim that the "single largest threat to the modern
administrative state is itself." 132 Ruhl applies complexity theory to
the modern environmental regulatory structure to demonstrate the
rule accretion phenomenon.'3 3 Rule accretion occurs when cultures
127 Id. at 980.
12' See Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law, supra note 2, at 452; see also infra
Part I.C.
1'9 See Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law, supra note 2, at 452.
130 Ruhl & Salzman, Red Queen, supra note 2, at 782-87.
131 Id. at 432-33.
[I]n the 1970s, the system made a long jump to what was then
a much fitter form of regulation--command-and-control
statutes.... [tIhe rest of society [however,] has ... evolved in
response to that statutory response and today poses very real
challenges to the fitness of the command-and-control approach.
Id. (citations omitted).
132 Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., Arrow of the Law, supra note 2, at 481.
133 Id. at 452.
When any one law in such a complexly structured legal system
fails to work as planned, society is vulnerable to more than just
the failure of that law. Society is also faced with the
unpredictable ripple effects the law's failure will have on the
proper functioning of many other laws and, consequently, the
other social institutions with which the laws are intertwined. As
this failure reverberates through the legal system, society
responds with more inherently (but not intentionally)
interdependent laws designed to patch up the system, adding to
the vulnerability of the system. Structural complexity breeds
vulnerability, which breeds more structural complexity, which
breeds more vulnerability, and so on.
Id.
[WIhen law and society in general have become highly
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change and society responds with new laws, more courts, and an
increase in the number of regulatory and enforcement agencies
and "other apparatus of legal institutions designed to distribute
legal justice."'34 The "law of declining [diminishing] returns"'3 5
affects societies investing in new, incremental laws to offset
changing cultural conditions.'3 6
The environmental regulatory structure overlooks system
complexity and strives for simplicity at the expense of
adaptability. 3 7 Rigid rules lead to short-term predictability,
structured, each new law has effects, some of which are
unanticipated and unintended.... Any new law added to the
pot of existing laws is likely on average to produce less marginal
net benefits to society than did the previous law. Lawmakers in
a complexly structured society must deal with the law of
declining returns.
Id. at 443; see also Ruhl & Salzmann, Red Queen, supra note 2, at 821-22.
134 Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., Arrow of the Law, supra note 2, at 443.
135 Id. at 443.
136 Id. at 442-43. Ruhl describes the sociolegal system's "cycle of increasing
structural complexity:"
1. Society responds to a perceived problem by increasing the
complexity of legal structures-for example, a new law, a
new agency, a new precedent, or a new administrative
program.
2. The increasingly complex legal structure distributes costs
and benefits, both directly and through unforeseen
mechanisms, unevenly throughout the population, thus
increasing heterogeneity.
3. With each additional increment of legal structure, each
individual moves closer to a unique set of costs and
benefits, thus increasing the number of groups and
decreasing the cross- membership between groups.
4. As heterogeneity increases, the spectrum of inequality
across the population widens, thus leading to other
perceived problems for social response.
5. Society responds to the new problems through further
investment in legal structure.
Id. at 466. The fifth step differs from the first step "in the important respect that
the decreasing returns effect requires the intensification of investment in legal
structure at Step 5." Id. (citation omitted)
137 Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 908.
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centralized authority, and decreased interaction among those most
affected by regulatory decisions. 3 ' System adaptability suffers as
a result of three legal elements that "combine to produce a highly
effective rulemaking machine."'39 "Congress and the Nondelegation
Doctrine, " 140 multiple, "atomized agencies,""' and legislative and
judicial deference to agency decisions.
In essence, the modern administrative state unsuccessfully
tries to alleviate uncertainty by creating more and more rules. The
promulgation of new rules dominates the landscape, preventing
.3 Id.; see also Ruhl & Salzmann, Red Queen, supra note 2, at 766 (arguing that
"even in a [Regulatory Kingdom] comprised of individually perfect rules-rules
that satisfy the three qualities of efficiency, clarity, and freedom from
institutional bias-accretion can . . . impede the ability of government to
demonstrate its efficient delivery of regulation's purported benefits") (citations
omitted).
139 Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 908.
140 Id. (stating that Congress "has evolved into a body that no longer makes
decisions but rather assigns them to be made by agencies").
'41 1d. at 909 (arguing that "reductionism permeates our legal system down to its
structural approach of dividing the administration function into many discrete
agencies with specific missions").
142 Id. at 9 10-11 (arguing that Congressional and judicial deference to agencies'
decisions and decision-making processes ensures "that whatever emanates from
the agencies' reductionist-bred black boxes . . . [survives] all but the most
probing legislative and judicial scrutiny"). Professors Ruhl and Salzmann
contend that the "political economy of regulation" also explains regulatory
accretion. See Ruhl & Salzmann, Red Queen, supra note 2, at 785-87. The
"[p] olitical [e]conomy of [r] egulation" is "the product of an alignment of both the
agencies' and the regulated community's economic interests in promoting more
rules." Id. at 785. Political economy includes several related phenomena. First,
the power of interest groups benefitting from specific regulations versus the
relatively weaker position of those favoring regulatory reduction or limitation.
Id. at 786. Second, regulatory agencies are motivated to promulgate new rules
satisfying particular interest groups, rather than eliminate existing regulations.
Id. at 787. Third, greater resources are necessary to remove rules than to add
rules to existing statutes. Id.; see also Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm,
supra note 2, at 910; Ruhl & Salzmann, Red Queen, supra note 2, at 784-85
(using evolutionary biologists' "Red Queen" concept to describe "natural
selection" in the administrative domain and the "constant competition between
agencies and the regulated community" as separate cause of regulatory
accretion).
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the environmental law system from "reach[ing] a state of dynamic
equilibrium over time, in which a balance between agents of
change is maintained until perturbed by external events."'
Modern legal theories inadvertently facilitate regulatory accretion
and the sociolegal system's eventual collapse by failing to accept
unpredictable complications as "an essential part of the system."'
D. Conclusion
Ruhl's application of complexity theory to the law-and-society
system produces a novel way of conceptualizing environmental
law. The characterization of regulatory problems as a function of
complexity theory principles challenges traditional notions of
causality in democratic governments. Ruhl's theoretical position
raises interesting questions about the role of normative judgments
and democracy in the design, implementation, and evaluation of
environmental laws and regulations.
II. THE LIMITS OF COMPLEXITY THEORY IN LAW AND SOCIETY
Ruhl illustrates the need to improve the flexibility of the
environmental regulatory system in the face of an ever-changing
world. But his regulatory reform efforts suffer from an attempt to
tackle the "archetypal philosophical problem: the problem of how
to reduce norms, rules, and justifications to facts, generalizations,
and explanations."'45 His theoretical approach yields an analogical
model implicitly premised on epistemic and normative superiority.
143 Ruhl & Salzmann, Red Queen, supra note 2, at 776 (citing PER BAK, How
NATURE WORKS passim (1996)).
14 Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 906.
1 RORTY, supra note 1, at 180. "[Tihe importance of Sellars's approach to
epistemology is that he sees the true and interesting irreducibility in the area
not as between one sort of particular (mental, intentional) and another (physical)
but as between descriptions on the one hand and norms, practices, and values
on the other." Id. at 180 n. 13 (citing WILFRID SELLARS, SCIENCE, PERCEPTION AND
REALITY 131 (1963)).
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The assumption that complexity theory is the unifying conceptual
framework for regulatory analysis and reform produces an
unrealistic, foundationalist
46 worldview. 147
The underdeveloped version of complexity theory presents a
threat, not a remedy, to the environmental regulatory system. 48
Human abilities to cause particular results disappear in the
law-and-society system. Complexity theory's explanations su-
persede alternative views of causality and displace humans as
causal agents. The theory's failure to reasonably account for
human cognitive and moral behaviors undermines the theory's
epistemic claims.'49 "Reality has to do with causation and our
146 See Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitabilty of Practical Reason: Statutes,
Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533,539 (1992) (arguing that
"practical reason means a rejection of foundationalism, the view that normative
conclusions can be deduced from a single unifying value or principle"); cf
CARTWRIGHT, supra note 29, at 34 (stating that
it is just the point of scientific activity to build models that get
in, under the cover of the laws in question, all and only those
circumstances that the laws govern. Fundamentalists want
more.... they want true laws; but most of all, they want their
favourite laws to be in force everywhere. I urge us to resist
fundamentalism. Reality may just be a patchwork of laws.).
147 See generally LARRY LAUDAN, PROGRESS AND ITS PROBLEMS 61 (1977) (arguing
that "worldview difficulties are like intra-scientific difficulties, except that here
the inconsistency, or lack of mutual reinforcement, is not within the framework
of science itself, but rather between science and our 'extra-scientific beliefs.'
Such beliefs fall in areas as diverse as metaphysics, logic, ethics and theology.")
(emphasis in original).
148 See Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 858
(acknowledging that applications of complexity theory to non-physical systems
are "controversial because they involve transporting principles learned initially
from computer-generated mathematical models to real-world contexts"); id. at
857 n.9 (noting that the "theory is developing, and there is not complete
agreement in the scientific literature as to its lexicon or meaning"); see also id.
at 856-57 n.7 (refusing to "begin to explore the elaborate mathematical theorems
used to portray dynamical system behavior and phenomena").
149 Ruhl's approach raises questions about the epistemic and normative
relationship between complexity theory's "elaborate mathematical theorems"
and the non-mathematical concepts Ruhl extracts from the theoretical nexus.
Should we consider the extracted concepts a reasonable means for determining
the theory's applicability? Do the extracted concepts retain their intended
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notions of reality are formed from our abilities to change the
world."1
50
Complexity theory and the sociolegal model do not provide
sufficient conceptual space for political liberty, democracy, or the
importance of normative judgment to laws' evaluation. In his quest
for a unifying explanatory theory, Ruhl moves far afield from the
fundamental human thoughts and actions that led to the formation
of the constitutional government. Environmental regulatory
reform surely depends upon deliberative democratic processes; in
the unified law-and-society system those processes disappear.
A. Sacrificing "Human-ness" for a Unifying Theory
Ruhl's application of complexity theory to the law-and-society
system unsuccessfully attempts to account for human capa-
cities-cognitive, moral, or social-and their role in important
causal processes. Ruhl's theoretical approach attributes causal
priority to forces outside human beings, as might be expected from
the application of a physical systems theory. Complexity theory's
physical systems' concepts do not produce a sociolegal model that
reasonably conforms to the environmental regulatory system. 5 '
1. Prologue: C. S. Holling's and Karl Popper's Overlapping
Experiences
Ruhl is definitely not the first to imagine he is participating
in a "loftier critical point of view"152 that reveals a fundamental
theory of explanation. C. S. Holling experienced the setbacks
associated with momentarily believing that a version of complex
meanings when separated from the theoretical nexus? Ruhl does not address
these and other questions bearing upon the determination of whether his non-
mathematical interpretation of complexity theory continues to constitute a
theory.
150 IAN HACKING, REPRESENTING AND INTERVENING: INTRODUCTORYTOPICS IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF NATURAL SCIENCE 146 (1983).
151 See LONGINO, FATE OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 23 and accompanying text.
152 RORTY, supra note 1, at 188.
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adaptive systems theory was science's "silver bullet."'53 Holling,
Lance H. Gunderson, and Donald Ludwig acknowledge their
experience with the "temptation to extend a theory of adaptive
cycles developed for ecosystem dynamics and renewal to other
systems, particularly organizational ones, business ones, and more
generally, social and political ones."
154
The three scientists note that apparent explanatory success
"did not help us avoid the pitfall of overstretched generality...
rather it made it worse."15 After reviewing the numerous scientific
theories and the natural and social phenomena they initially
believed fit their adaptive cycle model of change, Holling,
Gunderson, and Ludwig conclude with a succinct statement of the
lesson learned: "If a theory explains everything, it explains
nothing." 156 The scientists also suggest that adaptive systems
strategies should include an empirical approach designed to
explain change in human and in natural systems. 57 "What are
needed are alternative hypotheses and specific predictions that can
be tested empirically. That is possible for natural science
component systems but much less so for social components." 58
153 C.S. Holling et al., In Quest of a Theory of Adaptive Change, in PANARCHY 21
(Lance Gunderson & C.S. Holling, eds. 2002) (stating that "[o]ur goal for this
book was to develop and test theories that explain transformational change in
systems of humans and nature, theories that are inherently integrative").
154 Id. at 20 (internal citations omitted).
155 Id.
156 Id.; see also id. at 19 (noting risks associated with too much generality in
theory).
Generality is desired-but also to be feared. It is to be feared
because once a theory is formed, once it seems to resolve
paradoxes, and once it passes some empirical tests, proponents
are sorely tempted to extend its application beyond its natural
context. That is particularly true if the theory emerges in the
natural sciences and is applied to humans.
Id.
... Holling et al., supra note 153, at 19-20.
15 Id. at 20. "[WIe can continually ask where the emerging theory encounters
observations that are not consistent with the theory. Why living systems are not
like nonliving organisms. .... Why social systems are not like ecosystems. And
why linked ecological, social, and economic systems are not like any of the
above." Id.; see also SIMON A. LEVIN, FRAGILE DOMINION: COMPLEXITY AND THE
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Decades ago, Karl Popper anticipated the empirical challenge
that often subdues unifying theories claiming to produce useful
and reliable knowledge. In 1919, Popper was stymied by the
apparent explanatory power of three purportedly revolutionary
theories: Marx's theory of history, Freud's psycho-analysis, and
Alfred Adler's "so-called 'individual psychology.'"' 59
COMMONS 188-89 (1999) (arguing that human society presents conceptual
challenges unique to social systems for complex adaptive systems theory and
justifying his decision to "view evolution from the bottom up, starting from the
individual cell"). Compare id. at 188-89 (arguing that
[a]s we move up the ladder of complexity, not only the
definitions but also our understanding of the processes become
more problematical. Ant societies are highly differentiated
collectives of closely related organisms. As units, they have
many of the features of single organisms because they maintain
their integrity over time, but they still represent associations of
individuals in evolutionary competition. Human societies share
some of the same features: they represent consortia of
individuals who rely on one another. As such, there is
differentiation of function-some of us are carpenters, some
teachers, some doctors-and consequent interdependence. But
the members of a human society are not as closely related as the
members of a beehive or an ant colony, and membership in a
human society hence tends to be more ephemeral. The human
society does not have the continual integrity to function as an
evolutionary unit, though the organization of people into
societies clearly has deeply influenced the evolution of human
culture.),
with Ruhl, Complex Adaptive System, supra note 2, at 945 (stating that
[bly limiting observation to an individual ant-its foraging,
building, defending, and so on-it is highly unlikely the observer
could accurately predict the behavior of the ant colony. The ant
colony, unlike an individual ant, is highly adaptive, surviving
over time periods far in excess of individual ant lives and in the
face of a variety of environmental hazards, any one of which
poses death to individual ants. This pattern of adaptive
collective behavior emerging from the interconnected parts is
found throughout nature and human society.).
159 KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE 34 (5th ed. 1989) (1957).
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I found that those of my friends who were admirers
of Marx, Freud, and Adler, were impressed by a
number of points common to these theories, and
especially by their apparent explanatory power. These
theories appeared to be able to explain practically
everything that happened within the fields to which
they referred. The study of any of them seemed to
have the effect of an intellectual conversion or
revelation, opening your eyes to a new truth hidden
from those not yet initiated. Once your eyes were
thus opened you saw confirming instances every-
where: the world was full of verifications of the
theory. Whatever happened always confirmed it.
160
Popper eventually developed a theory he claimed would
distinguish between science and pseudo-science, proposing "that
the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or
refutability, or testability."6 ' This Article does not propose judging
the merits of Ruhl's approach with Popper's theory of falsifiability.
However, Holling, his colleagues, and Popper share a view about
the limits of theoretical explanation that raises questions about
the application of complexity theory (or parts of it)' 62 to "an
analogical model of law and society as a unified dynamical
system." 63
2. Human Capacities: MIA from Ruhl's Law-and-Society Model
In spite of complexity theory's "unifying" features,"M Ruhl's
approach creates an environmental regulatory world lacking
160 Id. at 34-35 (emphasis in original).
161 Id. at 36-37 (emphasis in original).
162 See supra note 148 (discussing the application of the non-mathematical
version of the theory).
16' Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 855-56 n.7.
164 See Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law, supra note 2, 435-36 (arguing that
"[c] omplexity theory and its fitness landscape model offers a unifying theoretical
perspective" for virtually all social and physical systems).
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conceptual space for human "capacities."65 Moreover, his
overextension of the analogy between dynamical systems and the
law-and-society system belies his concession that complexity
theory does not easily transfer to social systems. 16 His law-and-
society model does not satisfactorily account for the intrinsic,
important differences among components of complex physical
systems and human components in social systems. Complexity
theory concepts do not recognize humans as causal actors with
cognitive and normative capacities; the sociolegal model translates
"human" into an unfamiliar, and perhaps unknowable, kind of
"component."
Applying abstract concepts of a theory to a "real situation"
requires "a model of the situation in terms the theory can
handle." 67 The model should "mediate between theory and the
world"16s -representative models should resemble the situations
they purport to represent. 169 Theories produce "representative"
165 CARTWRIGHT, supra note 29, at 64 (arguing that capacities signify abilities,
tendencies, and propensities to do many different kinds of things). Cartwright
distinguishes between capacities and dispositions, stressing "that capacities are
not to be identified with any particular manifestations. They are rather like
'know', 'believe', 'aspire', 'clever' or 'humorous.'" Id.
166 See Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 867 (stating that
"[t]o be sure, the fit between the interaction of law and society and the analogical
model provided so far by dynamical systems theory is not perfect. Two
significant complicating factors are present-humans and the coevolving real
world."); Ruhl, Sustainable Development, supra note 2, at 56-57; see also supra
notes 21, 46-54 and accompanying text.
167 CARTWRIGHT, supra note 29, at 26.
1 8 Id. at 179.
1 9Id. at 193. Helen E. Longino argues that we may also view the theory itself
as a model since models often have a particular structure postulated to
reasonably depict the structure of phenomena under study. See LONGINO, FATE
OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 23, at 114. "This isomorphism permits the mapping
of the relations, structures, and processes of the model onto some portion of the
world." Id. Models may also purport to explain how things "in the domain under
study are related." Id. Longino calls this an "explanatory model for it functions
as a model or schema of how explanations of particular phenomena in a domain
are to be structured." Id. (citation omitted). Ruhl designs the model to describe
how the law-and-society system should be structured and how sociolegal
phenomena should be explained. See also supra Part I, particularly notes 45-90.
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models.7 ° of real situations by following "'language-entry rules' for
introducing the terms of [their] own abstract vocabulary and
thereby for bringing [their own] laws into play."'7 ' Theories may
also require "interpretative" models that depend upon "bridge
principles"'72  to apply abstract concepts to the world.173
Philosophically, bridge principles describe theories' domain
limitations and guide models' construction.'7 4
Ruhl is primarily concerned with developing an analogical
model of the sociolegal system.'7 5 He observes phenomena
occurring in the environmental regulatory system and concludes
that the phenomena (and the system's structure) sufficiently
resemble a "unified dynamical system" to warrant the application
of complexity theory concepts.'76 He does not provide criteria or
"bridge principles" from complexity theory to justify his
assumption that the theory provides "a lexicon for describing
system interaction, so that we may translate observations of
system behavior into models of reality."'77 In the absence of any
stated criteria or method for applying complexity theory's concepts,
other than his own subjective observations, one needs to carefully
consider whether Ruhl correctly assumes that complexity theory
applies analogically to the environmental regulatory system.
Helen Longino's work supports assessing a model's (or a
theory's) success based upon how well its descriptions "conform" to
the phenomena (or objects) of interest.'78 Conformation generally
170 CARTWRIGHT, supra note 29, at 180.
171 Id. at 26.
172 Id. at 190.
... Id. at 180-81 (suggesting that theories may also use abstract concepts "to
build a representative model in a systematic or principled way," resulting in
"interpretative models").174 Id. at 188.
175 See supra Part I, particularly notes 45-90.
17 1 See Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 855 n.7.
177 See id. at 862; see also supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
178 LONGINO, FATE OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 23, at 117 (arguing that "[con-
formation permits sorting representations along a continuum or several
continua, rather than dividing them into two exclusive classes, irrespective of
how well they suit our purposes, as does the true-false binary").
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refers to a "family of epistemological success concepts," 179 not
simply the binary choices "true" or "false."8 ° The concepts
everyday language uses to describe the relationship between maps
and their represented objects-such as fit, similarity, alignment,
isomorphism-provide illustrative examples."8 ' The point is to
modernize the standards used to evaluate models and theories
beyond the restrictive, and reductionist, binary "truth table"
concepts that preclude an understanding of how models do fairly
represent phenomena in the world.
18 2
a. Are Humans Analogous to Complexity Theory's "Components"?
The analogical application of complexity theory does not
produce a reasonable representation of phenomena in the
sociolegal system. For example, one of Ruhl's hypotheticals
illustrates the conceptual cost of applying complexity theory's basic
lexicon to the sociolegal system. 3 The hypothetical provides an
example of translating observations into models of reality. Ruhl
describes a driver, "Betty," who goes to visit her friend, "John."
184
Ruhl traces Betty's traffic route in terms of complexity theory's
rules of motion, attractors, initial state, and other relevant
concepts.
185
Each dynamical system has an n-dimensionalplaying
space, known technically as a manifold or phase
space, which contains all the possible system
states.8 6 In Betty's traffic world, her playing space is
179 Id. at 117.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 862; see also supra
notes 46-60 and accompanying text.
18' Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 862-63.
185 Id. at 863.
186 "Phase space is 'an abstract space in which a single point completely defines
the instantaneous state of a dynamical system .... The dimension of the space
depends on the number of variables needed to define the system.'" Id. at 862
n.21 (quoting COVENEY & HIGHFIELD, supra note 39, at 364).
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the local roadway network. Each system also must
have a set of rules of motion, known technically as
vector fields, which tell the system components where
and how to go next from wherever they are now. For
Betty, her rules are the traffic regulations that exist
on the route she takes between her and John's
houses. The path that a system takes-Betty's route
to John's house-is the system trajectory, 187 and the
system starting point-Betty's house in our traffic
world-is the system's initial state."'8 Finally, and
most important of all, the final condition of the
system's trajectory-John's house for Betty-is the
system's attractor.
8 9
Hence, phase space is not simply the four-dimension space-time
space that we observe in the physical world, but rather an n-
dimensional playing field, with n being all the relevant variables
of system operation, within which the instantaneous state of the
system is a single point representing the concurrently
instantaneous values of all the variables of the system.
Id. (citing Ian Stewart, Portraits of Chaos, in EXPLORING CHAOS: A GUIDE TO THE
NEW SCIENCE OF DISORDER 46-47 (Nina Hall ed., 1991)).
17 See supra note 53.
188 See supra note 52.
's Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 862-63; see also
supra notes 49-55; id. at 863 n.24 ("Thus, the attractor is '[a] way to describe the
long-term behavior of a dissipative system in phase space.'") (quoting COVENEY
& HIGHFIELD, supra note 39, at 360); id. ("The term attractor is somewhat
misleading, as it implies the presence of a force of attraction or a goal-oriented
state, whereas the term is intended to mean simply that the rules of motion of
the system produce a certain behavior that the attractor describes.") (citing
COHEN & STEWART, supra note 39, at 206-07).
The distinction is aptly described through the example of a lake
draining a watershed. As rain falls within the watershed, rules
of chemistry, gravity, and physics operate on the water. The
result of the water's behavior is the lake-the attractor-but the
lake did not itself exert an attractive force upon the water.
Id. (citing STUART A. KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE (1995)); see also
supra note 55.
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Note that Betty is a system component and her trip is not
described in terms of her choice among various alternatives; the
event is explained in terms of the system's "components," "rules of
motion," "trajectory," and "attractors." The causal relations among
the complexity theory concepts are postulated as equivalent to the
conceptual relations among less abstract concepts. The more
concrete concepts correspond to the theoretical concepts in that
"Betty" = component, "traffic regulations" = rules of motion, "route"
= trajectory, and "John's house" (destination) = attractor, where
the operator "=" is understood to mean "equivalent to" within the
specific context of the hypothetical. 9 0 The explanation advanced by,
either set of concepts purports to describe the same phenomena in
the natural world-Betty driving to John's house-although
communicating the meaning of complexity theory's explanation
may require a specialized community of listeners. 9 '
Ruhl's contention that complexity theory provides an accurate
lens through which to evaluate natural and social phenomena
conflicts with an understanding of human beings. Humans have
the ability, or "capacity,"'92 to reflect, to decide, to know, to teach,
to err, to empathize, and the like; they are unable to consider those
capacities as conceptually distinct from their understanding of
what it means to be "human."'93 Human capacities make it possible
190 SeeHiLARY PUTNAM, MIND, LANGUAGE AND REALITY 269 (1975) (arguing that
two descriptions are "equivalent if they are the same except for the description
of the extension, and the two descriptions are coextensive") (emphasis in
original).
191 See generally id. at 228. Putnam proposes the
Hypothesis of the Universality of the Division of Linguistic
Labor: Every linguistic community ... possesses at least some
terms whose associated 'criteria' are known only to a subset of
the speakers who acquire the terms, and whose use by the other
speakers depends upon a structured cooperation between them
and the speakers in the relevant subsets.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
192 See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 29, at 64; see also supra note 165 and
accompanying text.
193 See CARTWRIGHT, supra note 29, at 70 (stating that "[flor us, there are
properties, and all properties bring capacities with them").
[Iun modern science we separate our definition of a property
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for humans to produce certain effects. In other words, humans
participate in the causal relations occurring in the world in virtue
of their capacities. Complexity theory, as applied through Ruhl's
model, dissolves human capacities into components whose
behaviors are caused by external factors-rules of motion (i.e.
vector fields). Self-reflection and deliberation are less important,
distracting attention from the "real causal process producing our
behavior"'194 -processes occurring at levels to which only the
complexity theorist has access.19
The hypothetical illustrates that the application of complexity
theory to the human system hangs on a theory of reference that
unreasonably absorbs human capacities into the theory's
explanatory framework. Consider again the explanation for Betty's
behavior. As a system component, Betty's behavior is a function of
the rules of motion-the traffic rules and regulations.'96 As a
human being in the complex sociolegal system, her behavior is also
explained as a particular manifestation of free will indicating she
obeyed the rules.'97
from our characterisation of what kind of change it naturally
produces. Still, when we associate a particular principle of
change with a given structure or characteristic, we expect that
association to be permanent, to last so long as the structure is
what it is.
Id. at 81 (arguing that separating properties from causal relations produces
erroneous understandings).
194 HELEN E. LONGINO, SCIENCE AS SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE: VALUES AND OBJECTIVITY
IN SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 174 (1990) [hereinafter LONGINO, SCIENCE AS SOCIAL
KNOWLEDGE].
195 See id. (arguing that mechanistic, neurobiological explanations for human
behavior reconceptualize "[h iuman capacities for self-reflection and deliberation
[as] idle epiphenomena... processes... to which only the scientist or physician
have access").196 See supra notes 186-189, 49-54 and accompanying text.
197 See Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 873 (arguing
that complexity theory explains "a particular manifestation of human free will
[is] expressed as a point on a trajectory that meanders among the attractors of
freedoms, rights, and regulations").
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Suppose that someone violates a rule. Ruhl's model198 is
conceptually inadequate 99 to reasonably and consistently explain
a rule violator's behavior. When a person disobeys the rules of
motion-the traffic laws-his behavior is evidently not governed
by the vector fields-the rules of motion.200 But if a system
component's behavior is not directed by the rules of motion, such
as in the rule violator case, then a different concept is needed to
explain the human capacity to decide to break the rule. Moreover,
given the violator's case, one is no longer assured that
explanations for Betty's behavior are reducible to a function of the
rules of motion even when she obeys the rules. Ruhl's hypothetical
helps illustrate that the postulated causal relations among the
theory's concepts20. do not provide reasonable explanations for
human behaviors in a rule-breaking case. The theoretical concepts
do not account for human capacities.
Ruhl suggests that complexity theory's attractor concepts
20 2
provide the solution to the "free will" dilemma; the attractor simply
changes if the exercise of free will violates the causal relations
among complexity theory concepts. 20 3 He also opines that humans
"' See supra notes 186-189, 49-54. See generally notes 37-93 and accompanying
text (discussing Ruhl's model).
'99 See LONGINO, FATE OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 23, at 119 (arguing that "[w]e
rate the adequacy of theories and models by their power to enable us to pursue
our endeavors successfully with respect to the domains of which they are
representations"). Ruhl's analogical model should provide regulatory and policy
guidance in the sociolegal domain.
200 See supra notes 186-189, 49-54 and accompanying text.
201 Id. See generally notes 37-93.
212 Seegenerally notes 55-56 (indicating that the "attractors" concepts correspond
to system behavior patterns).
203 See Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 874-75.
[Law contributes to the resolution of issues of free will in a law-
and-society system-contract disputes, gender discrimination,
environmental pollution, or whatever else-through the balance
of freedoms, rights, and regulations. Those are the law-and-
society system's attractors for determining the mix of law-based
mechanisms for managing the complications posed by human
freedom of will.
Id. It is important to recall that freedoms, rights and regulations are important
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may be described as a complex adaptive system: "One can also
present free will as the manifestation of the fact that each human
is a dynamical system consisting of at least some strange
attractors, and thus behaves in unpredictable ways."20 4 Ruhl's
assertions beg the question of whether complexity theory concepts
adequately translate observations of sociolegal system phenomena
into reasonable representations of behavior.205 Attractors describe
system behavior; they do not provide the causal force Ruhl
attributes to rules of motion. "An attractor is simply a model
representation of the potential long term behavior of the system,
a useful concept for exploring different kinds of long-term
behavior."2 6 One is left back at the beginning, searching for
complexity theory explanations for human deliberative processes
causing human actions (particularly those acts that contravene the
rules of motion, i.e., laws).0 7
There is an additional but perhaps less abstract argument
that illustrates an unacceptable level of conceptual ambiguity-in
the context of free will-among complexity theory's terms. Human
rule violations are not sufficiently explained as a function of
"strange attractors 2 °8 because violations may be intentional and
predictable. Humans may break rules for very good reasons. One
can easily imagine a subset of all past and future rule violators
who communicate their intentions to another human before acting.
Complexity theory cannot reasonably translate this intentional
behavior into its causal framework. The justification for civil
disobedience is essentially normative; as detailed in subsequent
attractors on the 'law-side" of the law-and-society system. See supra notes 70-72
and accompanying text; see also Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra
note 2, at 875 n.56 (suggesting that "another important area of inquiry with
regard to management of free will in the law-and-society system would be
describing the balance between the law-based and society-based attractors").
204 Id.
205 See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text.
206 Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law, supra note 2, at 419 n.27 (citing
COVENEY & HIGHFIELD, supra note 39, at 360); see also supra notes 55-56.
207 See supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text.
208 See supra notes 39 and 56 for a discussion of strange attractors; see also supra
notes 202-07.
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sections,20 9 the unified conceptual framework does not sufficiently
account for norm-based, intentional behaviors.
b. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council
210
Ruhl also articulates his free will position through a
complexity theory analysis of Lucas.211 However, his discussion of
freedoms, rights, and regulations further illustrates the problems
with applying complexity theory concepts to human systems.212
Complexity theory describes the three law attractors21 3 in a way
that distorts the concepts' legal meanings. Ruhl's complexity-based
interpretation of Lucas leads him to characterize Fifth Amendment
rights against unlawful takings as "freedoms," but the legal right
to bring nuisance actions as a "right."214 The complexity theory
analysis of the Lucas decision neither supports Ruhl's conceptual
distinction between rights and freedoms, nor realistically portrays
free will and its critical relationship to human thought and action.
The conflict in Lucas was between the government of South
Carolina and an individual, Lucas.2'15 Justice Scalia traced the
origins of the rules governing the dispute to the "historical compact
recorded in the Takings Clause that has become a part of our
constitutional culture."21 6 The "compact" is part of the Bill of
Rights, which Justice Story suggests "may often be indispensable,
whenever it operates as a qualification upon powers, actually
granted by the people to the government."2 17 Justice Story also
describes the background principles that produced a formal
constitutional expression of the common-law right.
209 See infra Part II.B-C.
210 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see also supra notes 61-79 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 61-79 and accompanying text.
212 See id.
213 These attractors are freedoms, rights, and regulations. See supra notes 70-72
and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 61-79 and accompanying text.
215 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1009.
216 Id. at 1028.
217 JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR ExPoSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION § 436 (The Legal
Classics Library 1992) (1840).
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The concluding clause is, that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compen-
sation. This is an affirmance of a great doctrine
established by the common law, for the protection of
private property. It is founded in natural equity, and
is laid down by jurists as a principle of universal
law.
2 18
Ruhl's distinction between freedoms and rights unreasonably
separates human action and human constraint of another into
mutually exclusive sociolegal concepts that conflict with the terms'
legal meanings. Ruhl's concepts imply that there will never be a
conflict of "rights." But many situations will require some observer
to determine which person in a conflict acted "in accord with his
own subjective free will"219 by exercising a "freedom," and which
person simply constrained another's freedoms by exercising a
"right."220 Ruhl's description of the attractors' meanings commits
him to the view that constraining another's freedom does not
include acting in "accord with his own subjective free will;"
otherwise, the actor would be exercising a right.
Consider carefully Ruhl's use of free will to describe the
meaning of freedoms and rights. He limits the role of free will to
the concept of freedoms-acting in accord with "subjective free
will."221 On the other hand, free will is apparently not a causal
factor for the human actions described as rights-the constraint of
another person's freedoms. 222 Ruhl's theoretical distinction between
freedoms and rights attractors creates an incoherent causal
dichotomy between the human decisions causing an act, pursuant
to free will, and the decisions that cause human restraint of
another. Moreover, the complexity theory explanation is based
upon resultant behaviors, which suggests the human's mental
218 Id. § 394.
219 Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 873.
220 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
221 See supra notes 70-72.
222 See supra note 71.
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processes are causally less important.223 The explanation simply
fails to overcome the conceptual ambiguity that prevents
reasonable causal explanations for human behaviors in the law-
and-society system. "There is much in humanjudgment and action
that is possible only because of practical skills and competence
that remain beyond the reach of theoretical articulation."
224
The application of complexity theory also misrepresents the
relationship between freedoms expressed as formal legal rights
and liberty that is not yet formally recognized as law. The law-and-
society model is unable to account for Justice Story's historical,
sociolegal description of the genesis of the Fifth Amendment
protection against unlawful takings.225 In America's legal system,
the concepts of rights and freedoms differ legally based on whether
the legislature or the courts has declared specific informally
recognized human freedoms off-limits to government interference.
The resultant formal expression of a "freedom" is called a legal
"right."226 The sociolegal model overlooks the political, and
necessarily human, processes contributing to this transition.
3. Conclusion
One of the primary problems with applying unified physical
(or metaphysical) theories to social systems is that they lose touch
with phenomena occurring in the world. In this case, the sociolegal
model struggles through a failed attempt to reasonably incorporate
humans into the law-and-society system's theoretical framework;
humans cannot be reasonably reduced to objectified components.
The law-and-society model assumes the sufficiency of causal
223 See LONGINO, SCIENCE AS SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 194, at 174.
224 Brian Leiter, Heidegger and the Theory of Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J. 253,
280-81 (1996) (arguing that practical reason proponents should adopt "the 'No-
Theory Theory' [which claims that a] judicial decision is not something about
which one should expect to have a theory, because one can never produce the
needed theoretical reduction of adjudication to explicit rules of decision").
225 See supra note 218.
22 6 See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 4-5 (1990) (distinguishing between "formal
constraints-such as rules that human beings devise-and . . . informal
constraints-such as conventions and codes of behavior").
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explanations that are entirely external to components and their
capacities. Complexity theory does not provide Ruhl with sufficient
explanatory space for human decisions (or other internal, mental
and emotional processes) to be regarded as causally responsible for
human behavior.
The complexity theory approach suffers from a recurrent
problem with conceptual ambiguity.227 Theoretical concepts should
be sufficiently clear to avoid circular explanations and to
determine a concept's applicability within the theoretical
domain.228 Complexity theory concepts lack the intrinsic and
relational descriptions necessary to meaningfully identify and
explain relevant phenomena in the sociolegal world. Moreover,
Ruhl does not articulate the methods and criteria necessary to
identify the systems that lie within the scope of complexity theory
or determine how and under what circumstances the model will
produce reliable knowledge claims.229 Ruhl should stop short of
attempting to translate the sociolegal system's concrete
occurrences (e.g., rule violators) or abstract concepts-freedom,
rights, and regulations-into complexity theory's conceptual
framework. The sociolegal model's shortcomings could hardly be
227 See LAUDAN, supra note 147, at 49-50.
[T]he ambiguity of concepts is a matter of degree rather than
kind. Some degree of ambiguity is probably ineliminable .... It
may even be true that some small measure of ambiguity is a
positive bonus, since less rigorously defined theories can often
be more readily applied to new domains of investigation than
more rigid ones. But granting that, it is nonetheless true that
systematic and chronic ambiguity or circularity within a theory
often has been, and should be, viewed as highly disadvan-
tageous.
Id.
22 See id. at 50 (arguing that the "increase of the conceptual clarity of a theory
through careful clarifications and specifications of meaning is, as William
Whewell observed more than a century ago, one of the most important ways in
which science progresses").
229 See id. at 57-61 (arguing that "[tihe whole point of a methodological rule...
is to offer a norm for scientific behavior; to tell us what we should, or should not,
do in order to achieve the cognitive, epistemic, and practical goals of the
scientific enterprise").
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more egregious-humans are the essential feature of any
regulatory system or structure. One cannot meaningfully conceive
of an abstract set of concepts, an explanation, an analogy, or even
a metaphor, that fails to account (at least implicitly) for intrinsic
human features necessarily characterizing the promulgation,
implementation, and enforcement of all regulations. Human free
will is much more than a "complicating factor" for Ruhl's model. In
the context of law and society, it is a limiting factor that precludes
the development of a representative or interpretative model based
upon complexity theory.
Human capacities distinguish humans as a unique kind of
component. The causal relations among social systems'
components-and the sociolegal system in particular-necessarily
differ in kind and complexity as a result of human capacities.
Applying complexity theory's concepts (e.g. "rules of motion,"
"attractors," and "trajectory") to the sociolegal "system" necessarily
sacrifices humanity (or "humanness") to retain conceptual
coherence.
B. Complexity Theory: Is Democracy Obsolete?
Ruhl's mechanical explanation for law's evolution 230 is socially
and morally problematic. He creates a unified system of legal
explanation at odds with principles of democracy and deliberative
government. Complexity theory's disregard of human capacities
231
has potentially severe consequences for political liberty and
traditional methods of evaluating law's success. The sociolegal
model supplants democratic explanations for changes in law with
analysis justified by complexity theory's unified framework.
1. Complexity Theory's Consequences for Political Liberty
"And surely nothing of mere earthly concern is more worthy of
the profound reflection of wise and good men, than to erect
structures of government, which shall permanently sustain the
230 See supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
231 See supra Part II.A.2.
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interests of civil, political, and religious liberty, on solid
foundations. " 232
Ruhl's mechanistic description of laws as biological species
existing on a "fitness landscape"233 erodes the relationship among
laws, government, and individual liberty. The sociolegal model
depicts a process of change in law that does not satisfactorily
account for humans' central role in changing laws and government.
Political liberty ideals lose their significance in complexity theory's
law-and-society system. Ruhl's attempt to develop a nonideological,
nonnormative basis for regulatory change234 absorbs political
liberty into an unrealistic, non-democratic conceptual framework.
Liberty is often discussed in two distinct, but practically
overlapping, forms: "positive" and "negative."2"5 John Stuart Mill's
treatise236 focuses primarily upon "negative" freedom-the
individual's freedom from unwarranted governmental control.237
"There is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion
with individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain
232 STORY, supra note 217, § 57.
233 Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1452-53.
[W]e find law in the same boat as species-having to grope
around on the fitness landscape searching for higher peaks and
trying to avoid the valleys. Complexity Theory explores how an
organism-used here broadly to mean laws, species, or
components of any system-moves around on its fitness
landscape.
Id.
234 See supra Part I.A.3.
235 See, e.g., John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER
WRITINGS (Mary Warnock ed., 1974) (1859).
236 Id.
237 See id. at 135. Mill explains that the purpose of his essay is to establish
that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually
or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of
their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Id.; see also LONGINO, SCIENCE AS SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 194, at 171;
DEBORAH STONE, THE POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING
109 (1995) (defining negative liberty as a "lack of interference with individual
action").
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it against encroachment, is as indispensable to a good condition of
human affairs, as protection against political despotism."238
Political liberty also includes the positive freedom to
participate in decision-making processes bearing upon political
issues, including-either directly or indirectly-the promulgation,
implementation, enforcement, and modification of environmental
regulations.2 31 The freedom to choose to participate in political
activities, to run for political office, and to hold particular political
beliefs fall within positive liberty.24 ° The negative and positive
aspects require that political authorities enact normative laws or
rules governing the relationship between government power and
human behaviors.
"Political liberty presupposes [individual] autonomy and...
responsibility."2 4' Individuals have the right to choose to make
independent, deliberative decisions and the responsibility to act on
their decisions, under appropriate circumstances.242 Liberty is
intricately connected to the concept of self-determination and the
notion that human behaviors generally illustrate the final product
of deliberate decisions.243
Positive liberty's corollary of deliberative decision-making
poses logical and practical problems for the democratic principle of
"equality."244 Ideally, citizens would have control over all decisions
affecting their rights and well-being, and their decisions would be
based upon the best available information. However, citizens'
decision-making attributes, such as intelligence, and interests,
such as politics, vary. Accordingly, so too do their social, economic,
and political conditions. Moreover, the inability to make
reasonable, well-informed decisions is dependent upon political
238 Mill, supra note 235, at 130.
239 See LONGINO, SCIENCE AS SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 194, at 171-72;
STONE, supra note 237, at 128 (arguing that positive liberty is "the availability
of meaningful choice and the capacity to exercise it").
240 See STONE, supra note 237, at 128.
241 LONGINO, SCIENCE AS SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 194, at 172.
242 See id.
243Id.
244 See STONE, supra note 237, at 128-29.
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power, wealth, and knowledge.245 Political connections enable one
to actively exercise control over the range of available choices
affecting the outcome of a particular political conflict. Lack of
wealth interferes with a citizen's ability to devote time and
resources necessary to research relevant choices.246 Finally, the
more knowledge one has about the possible conflict outcomes, the
better one's decision.247 Liberty becomes a matter of degree; "those
with more power, wealth, and knowledge, have more freedom than
those with less."
248
The law-and-society system significantly curtails "positive"
political liberty. Complexity theory reorganizes environmental
regulatory debates to focus on a law's "fitness."249 "Biologists do not
ask whether a species has been 'good' for its ecosystem when
evaluating the single species' fitness. Similarly, questions of
morality and overall public policy have no place in measuring the
fitness of a particular law, although the policies underlying laws
certainly are normatively designed."25 °
Ruhl translates the process of change in law into complexity
theory's biologically-derived concepts of "species," "fitness," and
"fitness landscape."251' However, Ruhl's analytical approach is
245 See id.
246 Id. at 128.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 129.
249 See supra notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
250 Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1451; see infra notes 251-90 and
Part II.C.2. One may conclude that the sentence's last clause, "although the
policies underlying laws certainly are normatively designed" does not fit with
the rest of Ruhl's evolutionary position; the clause certainly does not suggest a
"non-ideological, non-nonnormative basis" for regulatory reform; see also supra
notes 80-93 and accompanying text.
251 Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1453.
[T] he fitness landscape model of Complexity Theory, by unifying
the uphill march of natural selection with the downhill error
catastrophe made possible by species selection, begins to adjust
the neo-Darwinian theoretical features to the reality of
evolution. The real point, however, is that whether the species
is on the way up or down a peak, marching across a fitness
landscape is a pretty inefficient way of searching for higher
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definitely not analogical. He argues that "[elvaluating fitness [i.e.,
whether a law achieves its policy goal] does not permit normative
evaluations for laws any more than it does for species."252 But laws
lack several essential features necessary to reasonably translate
the process of evaluating law's change into a complexity theory
analysis. 253 Laws do not have genotypes or phenotypes and
therefore may not be intelligibly described by evolutionary
statements such as "variation, heritability, differential fitness, and
... cumulative selection result in [natural] selection on organisms,
and . . .gradual change in populations over time."254 Moreover,
"fitness evaluations" necessarily require organisms existing from
one generation to the next. Laws are not life forms; there is no
reasonable way to delimit a law's "generation." Ruhl errs by
characterizing law's normative features in terms of a fitness
evaluation,255 unreasonably speculating that law's evolution is a
mechanical function of "fitness landscapes."256
Complexity theory's analysis-if accepted by those with
political authority-carries a high social and political risk;
knowledge is power. Governments endorsing complexity theory's
claims about fitness evaluation may rely upon the theory to
identify issues worthy of consideration and to suggest alternative
solutions. 7 Individuals may express their views and take
fitness peaks. It may be a deadly game also, as the time spent in
fitness valleys wandering between peaks is when a species risks
extinction. Laws, like biological species restricted to walking
their way from peaks to higher peaks, must be pretty lucky to
start out on Mount Everest.
Id. (citations omitted).
252 Id. at 1451.
253 Furthermore, the concepts are not uniformly described or used by
evolutionary biologists. See KIM STERELNY AND PAUL E. GRIFFITHS, SEX AND
DEATH: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY 372-77 (1999)
(discussing Stuart Kauffman's "NK model's" fitness landscapes).2-4 Id. at 37.
255 See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
256 See supra Part I.A.3.
257 After all, once the theory is accepted it can tell us about and evaluate fitness
landscapes. See infra Part II.C.2. for additional discussion of these issues in the
context of sustainable development and optimization algorithms.
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responsibility for their choices, but ultimately, regulatory issues
will be resolved by a higher epistemic and moral authority:
decision-makers relying upon complexity theory.
In the sociolegal system, political power shifts to complexity
theory experts and those with privileged access to such experts.
25 8
In this respect, Ruhl's formula for environmental regulatory
analysis harkens back to the New Deal's reliance on scientific
experts.259 Ruhl has simply created an expert with a more all-
encompassing range of knowledge and understanding. Ruhl's
experts not only provide fundamental information about
environmental regulatory subjects,26 ° but also about the proper
design and direction of the environmental regulatory system.26'
Complexity theory's implicit mandate to convert "norms, rules and
justifications to facts, generalizations, and explanations"262 will
lead environmental regulation into a new age of "scientific
management" uprooting traditional views of political liberty.263
Ruhl's reconceptualization of laws as species demonstrates the
challenge of applying a unifying theory to a political and legal
system. The analysis of a law's success cannot be meaningfully
separated from its essential relation to public policy and
morality.2" Law's success is a function of legal rules, or-
ganizational forms, enforcement characteristics, and norms of
258 See FRANKFURTER, supra note 30, at 157-58 (arguing that as scientific
knowledge grows and the "power which must more and more be lodged in
administrative experts, [the power] is prone to abuse unless its exercise is
properly circumscribed and zealously scrutinized").
259 James 0. Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363, 364-65 (1976) (arguing that proponents of "the New Deal's regulatory
initiatives regarded expertise and specialization as the particular strengths of
the administrative process").260 See supra notes 94-129 and accompanying text.
261 See supra Part I.
262 RORTY, supra note 1, at 180.
263 Cf. PAUL FEYERABEND, SCIENCE IN A FREE SOCIETY 9 (Verso ed., 1985) (1978)
(arguing that "[a] free society is a society in which all traditions have equal
rights and equal access to the centers of power") (emphasis omitted).264 See supra note 92 (describing law's analysis as an "independent" function of
"fitness landscape" evaluations); see also supra notes 80-93, 249-62 and
accompanying text.
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behavior.265 Individuals participating in deliberative democratic
processes, within the institutional framework,266 should determine
a law's success.
Ruhl's concept of law-gutted of its fundamentally normative
character-ceases to be law. The unified law-and-society system
approach fails to capture laws' normative features within its
concept of fitness landscape. Ruhl's evolutionary theory of law
minimizes the deliberative feature of democracy; the participatory
process of exchanging ideas about the merits of a law is absent
from Ruhl's model. Complexity theory's "explanatory power "2M7 does
not portray direct or representative democratic processes causing
change in law, nor does Ruhl satisfactorily explain human
decisions and actions leading to revolutionary change in law and
government. The only way to conceive of a non-ideological, non-
normative basis for change in law is to eliminate humans and laws
as they are currently understood conceptually, which cannot be
done.
2. "Democracy" in the Sociolegal Ecosystem: Neo-Darwinian
"Sex"
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men
are created equal; that they are endowed, by their
Creator, with certain unalienable rights; that among
these, are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
That, to secure these rights, governments are
instituted among men, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any
265 See generally NORTH, supra note 226, at 33 ("explor[ing] the relationship [be-
tween] the behaviorial assumptions... the characteristics of transacting... and
the institutional structure of a society" and arguing that property rights
"[a] ppropriation is a function of legal rules, organizational forms, enforcement,
and norms of behavior-that is, the institutional framework").
266 See id.
267 Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1417; see also supra notes 112-13
and accompanying text.
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form of government becomes destructive of these
ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish
it .... 
268
Ruhl argues that at the time of the formation of the United
States, the common law and the Constitution"form[ed] a sociolegal
ecosystem-a system of making rules-which is remarkably
adaptive."269 The modern administrative state, riddled with the
end-products of reductionist policies, suppresses the original
Constitutional State's complex system qualities27° and increases
the risk of modern catastrophe.2 1' Ruhl responds to these
regulatory problems by attempting to develop a coherent model of
law's process of change. 2  However, his approach substantially
undermines traditional understandings of democracy by placing
the concept into a neo-Darwinian, mechanical context.
Ruhl claims that democracy is "an agent of change"273 that
allows the system to evolve in a manner that maximizes
"fitness."274 In the sociolegal ecosystem, democracy is neo-
Darwinian "sex, contributing to the system's fitness potential
through the structural concepts of "patchiness" and "coupling."276
Ruhlian democracy potentially improves law's fitness by
26 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776).
269 Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1474.
270 Id. at 1480-81.
2171 Id. at 1481 (arguing that the current administrative state may appear
comfortable due to its "apparent predictability . . . [but] we will face an
increasingly ominous threat of a major catastrophe"); see also supra notes 37-45,
94-144 and accompanying text.
272 See supra notes 37-46.
273 Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1474.
274 Id.
271 Id.; see also id. at 1467 (arguing that the best way to structure the sociolegal
system to effectively and efficiently "jump" across "fitness landscapes" is through
"sex, that is, the sociolegal version of sexual reproduction-democracy").
276 Id. at 1474; see also supra notes 112-13.
20051 603
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. [Vol. 29:551
optimizing the system's dispersal of lawmaking power and the
degree of interrelatedness among lawmaking power "units."277
Ruhl again oversteps the boundaries of reasonable analogical
argument. Metaphorically, democracy may be likened to raw,
erotic and passionate sex, but simple neo-Darwinian copula-
tion-definitely not."8 Democracy and its governing institutions
are about people. The fundamental principles of demo-
cracy-liberty and equality-underlie government's promulgation
of formal rules and the cultural development of informal rules
encouraging and restraining various behaviors. 9 Social institu-
tions are, ideally, designed to promote and protect individual
values of liberty and equality in a just and efficient manner.28 °
Ruhl's discussion of democracy avoids addressing the critical
roles of government and normative judgment in regulation. Envi-
ronmental regulations are often based upon normative concerns
expressed as "collective desires, including aspirations... or consi-
dered judgments.... Laws of this sort are a product of deliberative
processes on the part of citizens and representatives .... This
understanding of politics recalls Madison's belief in deliberative
democracy."
28'
Complexity theory does not provide a reasonable explanation
for the "deliberative processes"28 2 that produced the constitutional
government or the environmental laws and regulations originating
in the 1960s and 70s. The sociolegal model does not satisfactorily
explain environmental regulation-such as clean air, endangered
species, or public land use-as a fundamentally normative process
based upon democratic principles.28 3
2 77 Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1475. Presumably, an optimization
algorithm to maximize coupling and patchiness awaits discovery on complexity
theory's horizon.
278 This Article hesitates to consider the Framers' reaction to Ruhl's "analogy."
Perhaps the Constitution was produced by the Big Bang.
279 See NORTH, supra note 226, at 6.
211 John Rawls, The Justification of Civil Disobedience, in CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 240, 241-43 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1969).
281 SUNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 57 (citation omitted).
282 See id.
283 See id.
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Cass Sunstein identifies several closely related normative
influences contributing to the democratic development of
environmental regulations.2 " Citizens may perceive law to provide
the best practical avenue for fostering a socially conscious state.28 5
Social consciousness may include measures intended to safeguard
future generations' well-being, for example, by protecting
biodiversity, public land resources, and air quality.2 6 Regulations
may also be designed to provide equal access to valued properties
and experiences, such as national parks and wildlife refuges.28 7 In
this sense, citizens act altruistically, considering the needs of their
neighbors and future citizens without attending first to their
private desires.288 The sociolegal model does not distinguish among
the various functions and goals of environmental regulation; Ruhl
unreasonably and mechanistically analyzes the complete set of
environmental regulations as "an undifferentiated whole."28 9
3. Conclusion
The sociolegal model depicts a society that is missing a
conceptual place for deliberative democracy. In Ruhlian democracy,
human norms and judgments are less important than complexity
theorists' views. The theory's fundamental flaws, in the context of
the sociolegal system, include an underlying theory of government
that eliminates individual liberty expressed directly or through
representatives in deliberative democratic processes, and the
284 See id. at 57-58.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 SUNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 57-58.
288 Id. at 57-60.
2 9 Id. at 48.
It is impossible to make claims about the precise scope and
nature of regulation without knowing a lot about the facts....
[I]n spite of these difficulties, regulatory statutes can be
distinguished according to function; they should not be treated
as undifferentiated wholes; they fall into recognizable patterns;
they are often subject, at least in principle, to a powerful
defense.
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essential role of norms in regulations'justification and evaluation.
The law-and-society model amounts to a justification for a non-
democratic, analytical approach to issues of environmental
regulation. Complexity theory's unifying principles allow Ruhl to
ignore many important features of democracy, including
leadership, group volitions, competition for political power, and the
relations between government power and individual liberties.29 °
Ruhlian democracy simply operates on a fundamentally different
set of rules and principles than traditional concepts of democracy.
The law-and-society system sacrifices government's distinctly
human character for coherence among complexity theory's
concepts.
C. Complexity Theory in Practice: Sustainable Development
Indeed, unless we choose to decentralize and to use
applied science, not as the end to which human
beings are to be made the means, but as the means to
producing a race of free individuals, we have only two
alternatives to choose from: either a number of
national, militarized totalitarianisms... or else one
supra-national totalitarianism, called into existence
by the social chaos . . . and developing, under the
need for efficiency and stability, into the welfare-
tyranny of Utopia. You pays your money and you
takes your choice.2 9'
Complexity theory's risks to the environmental regulatory
system become more pronounced in the practical context of
sustainable development. Ruhl's outlook for sustainable develop-
ment29 2 includes the notion that complexity theory's mathematical
290 See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269-73
(1st ed. 1942) (arguing that "the democratic method is that institutional
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the
power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote").
291 ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD xiv (2d ed. 1946) (1932).
292 Ruhl, Sustainable Development, supra note 2, at 35-36 (claiming that
"sustainable development defines all social problems in terms of three
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formulas will eventually be applicable to non-physical systems.2 93
The prospect accentuates the fundamentalist flavor of his legal
philosophy. Complexity optimization algorithms294 will someday
resolve the epistemic differences among relevant sciences'
knowledge claims and knowledge production methods.29 Equally,
if not more, important, complexity theory's algorithms will
supplant the normative basis for selecting among alternative
scientific theories and methods; the assumption is that the
algorithms will provide the best method for solving multi-
parameter, multi-dimensional social problems.296
Ruhl's attempt to describe the practical application of
complexity theory provides a final illustration of the "theory's"
conceptual and methodological limitations. No matter how
effective unifying theories may appear to be, they cannot employ
their own methods to justify heightened epistemic status.
Moreover, communities' normative judgments-not a mathe-
matician's calculations or a logician's symbolic analysis-select one
theory or policy over another.297 Devoting future time and energy
to the development of a unifying legal theory will unnecessarily
obscure the social reality of legislative and judicial practice.
parameters-environment, economy, and equity-and projects them in the
dimensions of geographic scale and time").
293 See infra notes 298-323 and accompanying text.
.94 See infra note 301 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II.C.1-2.
295 See infra Part II.C.1-2.
296 See supra note 292; see also infra Part II.C.2, notes 298-323 and
accompanying text.
297 See LONGINO, SCIENCE AS SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 194, at 12 (arguing
that the "development of knowledge is a necessarily social rather than individual
activity"); see also THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
184-85 (3d ed. 1996) (1962) (arguing that the importance of normative and
scientific values "emerges when the members of a particular scientific
community must" choose among new theories, competing scientific methods (e.g.
quantitative versus qualitative) and other"incompatible ways of practicing their
discipline").
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1. A Complex Vision for Sustainable Development
Ruhl foresees sustainable development 28  providing the
fundamental information necessary to complete the link between
mathematically advanced forms of complexity theory and the law-
and-society system.299 Complexity theory's analytical methods will
unify the information produced by disparate disciplines' research
in the separate but overlapping categories of ecology, economics,
and social equity. ° ° Ruhl suggests he discovered a link between his
complexity-based theory of law's evolution and sustainable
development's practical policies. "I have found complexity theory
useful for describing how the framework for the evolution of law
must be built: It must be designed around adaptive optimization
298 See Ruhl, Sustainable Development, supra note 2, at 38-39.
The Brundtland Commission defined the term as "development
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs." At the
core of this concept is "a process of change in which the
exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the
orientation of technological development, and institutional
change are all in harmony and enhance both current and future
potential to meet human needs and aspirations."
Id. (citing WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEV., OUR COMMON FUTURE 43,46 (1987)).
299 Ruhl, Sustainable Development, supra note 2, at 56-58; see also id. at 59
(arguing that ecosystem management relies upon "an emerging trend ... to
identify interdisciplinary indicators" that meaningfully combine social, economic
and ecological data traditionally packaged in separate units).
300 See Ruhl, Sustainable Development, supra note 2, at 57.
A crude algorithm for sustainable development would (1) find
the optimum for all three E's at one location and time, taking
into account the effects tinkering with any one will have on the
other two; then (2) evaluate the effects of the local solution on all
other local, regional, and global solutions; then (3) evaluate the
effects of the local solution on all future solutions; and finally (4)
repeat the process until the system reaches a stable, sustainable
equilibrium. The sustainable development algorithm thus must
iteratively solve the basic three E's goals, projected across time
and space, by accounting for all the feedback and feedforward
loops that exist in their coevolving system.
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algorithms. Sustainable development must forge such algorithms
and the ability to use them ...""'
The purpose of sustainable development policy "is to achieve
a social framework in which economy, environment, and equity all
are sustainable in perpetuity over all geographic scales." °2
Sustainable development "defines all social problems"30 3 in terms
of five interdependent components: economy, social equity, ecology,
time, and geographic scale.30 4 The time and geographic scale
variables are the sustainability policy "dimensions;"3 5 the three
remaining variables are the policy "parameters."3 6 The three
parameters of sustainable development present two decision-
making problems. Each variable corresponds to underlying
phenomena that are in a "constant [state ofi flux,"30 7 and
intervening to improve the conditions defining one parameter
value often adversely affects another parameter value.0 '
Sustainable development's purpose will eventually be realized
by adopting the fundamental problem-solving technique of
complexity theory-the adaptive search algorithm309-as a theme
for sustainable development.3 10 Sustainable development decisions
should be based upon fitness landscape analysis3 1' optimized by
301 Id. at 63.
302 Id. at 39.
303 Id. at 35.
304 Id. at 39-43; see also Ruhl, Co-Evolution, supra note 2, at 177 (asserting that
"sustainable development ... fuses environment, economy, and equity into one
policy triad").
305 Ruhl, Sustainable Development, supra note 2, at 43-44.
306 Id.
307 Id. at 43.
308 Id.
309 Id. at 46; see id. at 44-45 (arguing that the "approach that best responds to
[the multi-parameter, multi-dimensional knot] of sustainable development is
drawn from complexity theory-the field of research focusing on dynamic
systems that are complex, adaptive, and evolutionary").
310 Ruhl, Sustainable Development, supra note 2, at 57; id. at 37 (asserting that
sustainable development is more than just a policy or a philosophy; it is "a non-
static set of recipes, a problem-solving technique known as an algorithm").
311 See supra notes 37-45, 249-85.
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the application of search algorithms.3 12 Ruhl recognizes the current
knowledge deficit preventing such comprehensive algorithms, but
he strongly suggests that the algorithmic method will replace
policymakers' dominant tendency toward a linear, reductivist
313
approach. 4
2. The Epistemic and Normative Consequence of "Unifying"
Theories
Ruhl's claim that complexity theory's optimization algorithm
is the key ingredient for the conceptual framework of law's
evolution 315 is not surprising given his goal to develop a "coherent
theory of law's process of change."316 However, Ruhl does not justify
the assumption that complexity theory can ever do the epistemic
and normative work he claims. Synthesizing the competing claims
and theoretical bases of economics, ecology and other sciences into
an algorithmic formula is more than just a challenging prospect;
it exists (perhaps) as a logical possibility, forever beyond the realm
of practical reality.1 7
Ruhl's epistemic aspirations" ' resemble the proclamations
of philosophers claiming the higher ground of "epistemolo-
gical behaviorism. "319 Richard Rorty identifies the crux of the
312 Ruhl, Sustainable Development, supra note 2, at 45-46.
313 Id. at 46-47.
314 See id. at 62 (arguing that "we need to bring the environmental side of
information and modeling up to the level already achieved for economic and
social data, and then move to the next level in which multi-factor information
can be generated and modeled").315 See supra note 301 and accompanying text.
316 Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law, supra note 2, at 416.
317 Unless, of course, one wishes to engage in endless speculation about what
economics, ecology, and science itself might one day become as the human
condition changes to something far beyond our most Utopian imaginations.
311 See supra Part I.C.1.
31 9 RORTY, supra note 1, at 315; see also PAUL FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD 43
(Verso 3d ed., 2002) (1975) (arguing that
Parmenides' theory of the homogenous and unchanging One
illustrates a desire that has propelled Western sciences from
their inception up to the present time-the desire to find a unity
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problem with epistemological foundationalism as a "quest for
commensuration. " 32°
By "commensurable" I mean able to be brought under
a set of rules which will tell us how rational
agreement can be reached on what would settle the
issue on every point where statements seem to
conflict.32' These rules tell us how to construct an
ideal situation, in which all residual disagreements
will be seen to be "noncognitive" or merely verbal, or
else merely temporary-capable of being resolved by
doing something further.322
behind the many events that surround us. Today the unity
sought is a theory rich enough to produce all the accepted facts
and law .... );
CARTWRIGHT, supra note 29, at 34 (describing "fundamentalists" as those who
"want laws; they want true laws; but most of all, they want their favourite laws
to be in force everywhere"); LONGINO, SCIENCE AS SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE, supra
note 194. Cf John Dewey, The Logical Method of Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 27
(1924) (arguing that "newer rules may be needed and useful at a certain
juncture, and yet ... also become harmful and socially obstructive if they are
hardened into absolute and fixed antecedent premises").
320 RORTY, supra note 1, at 317.
321 Note that this sense of "commensurable" is not the same as
"assigning the same meaning to terms." This sense-which is
the one often used in discussing Kuhn-does not seem to me a
useful one, given the fragility of the notion of "sameness of
meaning." To say that parties to a controversy "use terms in
different ways" seems to me an unenlightening way of
describing the fact that they cannot find a way of agreeing on
what would settle the issue.
Id. at 316 n.1.
322 Id. at 316. Rorty describes the philosophical conflict stemming from the
search for knowledge foundations:
The dominating notion of epistemology is that to be rational, to
be fully human, to do what we ought, we need to be able to find
agreement with other human beings. To construct an episte-
mology is to find the maximum amount of common ground with
others. The assumption that epistemology can be constructed is
the assumption that such common ground exists.... To suggest
that there is no such common ground seems to endanger
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Rorty credits Thomas Kuhn with shedding light on the issue
of commensurability and pertinent issues bearing upon
algorithms.3 23  Kuhn questioned whether algorithms could
determine how to choose among competing scientific theories.324
Kuhn argued that value-laden factors, not algorithms and
comparative problem-solving, ultimately resolved theory choice
and scientific change.325 Scientists judge theories based on theories'
"accuracy, scope, simplicity, fruitfulness and the like."326 These
criteria justify the choice of one theory over another, but scientists
often differ in the relative importance they attribute to a particular
value, such as accuracy versus scope, and in their method of
applying each value to resolve a particular theory choice
dilemma.327 Algorithms are not capable of erasing value-based
differences in judgment and replacing the theory choice process
with a neutral, epistemically superior framework.3 2 ' For example,
complexity theory represents a new set of concepts and conceptual
framework; relevant communities will apply normative and
rationality. To question the need for commensuration seems the
first step toward a return to a war of all against all.
See id. at 316-17.
323 Id. at 322-33 (citing THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970) and THOMAS S. KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION
(1977)).324 Id. at 322.
325 THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 153-59 (3d ed.
1996); see also supra note 323.
326 Thomas S. Kuhn, Reflections on My Critics, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF
KNOWLEDGE 231, 261 (Irme Lakatos & Alan Musgrave eds. 1970).327 Id. at 261.
328 RORTY, supra note 1, at 327 (arguing that the criteria of theory choice
"'function not as rules, which determine choice, but as values which influence
it'") (quoting KUHN, THE ESSENTIAL TENSION 326 (1977)); see also Kuhn, supra
note 326 at 268-70 (arguing that language translation processes illustrate the
absence of a neutral language to resolve theory choice decisions; "a translation
manual inevitably embodies a theory, which offers the same sort of reward, but
also is prone to the same hazards, as other theories"); FEYERABEND, AGAINST
METHOD, supra note 319, at 14-19 (arguing that close attention to the history of
science illustrates there is no "fixed theory of rationality" governing scientific
"progress").
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scientific, value-based criteria to determine the legitimacy and
adequacy of the theory's content and methods.
Rorty builds on Kuhn's position to argue that epistemological
foundationalism amounts to a search for algorithms that govern
choices about what constitutes the knowledge of the world.329
Society cannot get outside itself to construct a neutral language
that describes the world as it is. 330 The problem with believing in
the epistemological power of algorithms and unifying theories is
that "the gap between the neutral language and the only
languages useful in deciding the issue at hand is too great to be
bridged by 'meaning postulates.' 3 3' Society is relegated to an
epistemological fall-back position that turns on the value-based
evaluation of knowledge choices in a socially discursive, normative
setting.332 Knowledge justification is a normative process that
guides knowledge content and production practices.333
329 RORTY, supra note 1, at 327.
330 Id. at 178-79.
331 Id. at 324; see also id. at 325 (arguing that we "need to give up the notion of
'data and interpretation' with its suggestion that if we could get the real data,
unpolluted by our choice of language, we should be 'grounding' rational choice").
332 See id. at 171 (arguing that considering "knowledge as a matter of
conversation and of social practice, rather than as an attempt to mirror nature,
we will not be likely to envisage a metapractice which will be the critique of all
possible forms of social practice"); LONGINO, FATE OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 23,
at 128-29 (arguing "that scientific knowledge is produced by cognitive processes
that are fundamentally social. An adequate normative theory of knowledge must
then be a normative theory of social knowledge, a theory whose norms apply to
social practices and processes of cognition.").
333 See LONGINO, FATE OF KNOWLEDGE, supra note 23, at 143 (arguing that
knowledge content and knowledge production practices should be justified
according to "central normative notions [ofi epistemic acceptability and
conformation . ..These involve both traditional evidential norms and the
community norms of effective critical interaction (criticism, for short)."); RORTY,
supra note 1, at 320.
Normal science is as close as real life comes to the episte-
mologist's notion of what it is to be rational. Everybody agrees
on how to evaluate everything everybody else says. More
generally, normal discourse is that which is conducted within an
agreed-upon set of conventions about what counts as a relevant
contribution, what counts as answering a question, what counts
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Ruhl suggests epistemic justification for environmental
regulatory decisions is not a social process. His reliance upon the
future of complexity theory leads to the position that the adequacy
of a knowledge claim about a sustainable development policy
decision is a function of complexity theory's algorithmic method.
He assumes that complexity theory will bridge the various
scientific disciplines' disparate explanations for phenomena
resulting in a unified whole.334 Sustainable development research
practices will produce the algorithmic language necessary to unite
the disciplines' knowledge claims under the complexity theory
roof.335 At a minimum, optimization algorithms will supersede all
competing strategies attempting to identify, integrate and
reconcile the knowledge claims relevant to sustainable develop-
ment policies.
Ruhl's claims about the power of algorithms are necessarily
dependent upon a "method of commensuration."336 Ideally,
complexity theory concepts and meta-principles33 7 will guide the
objective assimilation, evaluation and commensuration of all
knowledge claims relevant to sustainable development's three
parameters 3 8 and the two dimensions of time and geographic
scale. Ruhl's complexity theory advocacy unreasonably bypasses
the position that theory choice is a normative matter, not just a
logical, mathematical, or scientific process.
Ruhl's theoretical strategy unravels in two related respects.
First, social and scientific values will necessarily be an integral
part of the communal decision whether to accept optimization
algorithms over alternative methods as a guide for sustainable
as having a good argument for that answer or a good criticism
of it.
Id.
334 See supra notes 6-7, 31-93, 298-314.
3" See supra notes 298-314.
336 RORTY, supra note 1, at 320. "The idea of commensurability is built into the
notion of 'genuine cognition,' so that what is 'only a matter of taste' or 'of opinion'
need not fall within epistemology's charge, and conversely, what epistemology
cannot render commensurable is stigmatized as merely 'subjective.'" Id.
337 See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
338 These parameters are equity, ecology, and economy. See supra notes 302-08.
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development policies and practices. Second, social and scientific
values will necessarily influence the communal decisions that
determine the relative importance of theories and knowledge
claims produced under the three parameters of sustainable
development.
Ruhl acknowledges that the "optimization of sustainable
development... poses normative issues,"339 but he sidesteps the
important epistemic and normative issues34 outlined above. He
assumes the superior epistemic value of knowledge gleaned from
optimization algorithms, understood in the context of a unifying
theory. "The point of the algorithmic approach is to allow those
normative decisions to be as fully informed as possible in terms of
the effect of different choices on the overall performance of the
system."34 ' Ruhl's statement is an important epistemological and
normative claim. He is claiming that the algorithmic method will
provide us with the kinds of knowledge ("the effect of different
choices" produced via fitness landscape analysis) 42 necessary to
... Ruhl, Sustainable Development, supra note 2, at 56 n.77.
The optimization of sustainable development thus poses
normative issues, such as how much government control is
desired, how much intervention in individual family planning
decisions will be tolerated, how much income disparity is
acceptable, and so on. The point of the algorithmic approach is
to allow those normative decisions to be as fully informed as
possible in terms of the effect of different choices on the overall
performance of the system.
Id.
340 See supra notes 315-38.
341 See supra note 339.
342 Ruhl, Sustainable Development, supra note 2, at 45.
[A] fitness landscape [can be constructed] for any system of
connected interactions. The presence of such conflicting
constraints in the system may make the fitness landscape flat
or rugged and multipeaked. Much of the work in complex
systems research is aimed at understanding systems' fitness
landscape "search algorithms." These algorithms are the
problem-solving computations and adaptations that systems
apply in evolving across fitness landscapes; their objective is to
stay in optimum positions at all times.
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make sustainable development decisions. Moreover, the algo-
rithmic approach provides the best available knowledge ("as fully
informed as possible") for deciding among competing choices
bearing upon sustainable development policies.
Ruhl's response to normative concerns is disheartening.3 43
Bearing in mind that sustainable development "defines all social
problems"3" in terms of the three parameters and two dimensions,
he implies that decisions about the "correct" amount of government
control over citizens and families will be potentially guided by
optimization algorithms. 345 Eventually, the algorithms will
describe the fitness landscapes on the social policy horizon and
weigh competing alternatives for a given policy in terms of their
future impact upon the fitness landscape; no other analyses will be
necessary.346
3. Conclusion
Ruhl's algorithmic vision is clouded by logical and practical
problems. If sustainable development defines all social problems,
and optimization algorithms will eventually solve sustainable
development problems, then why must there be a choice of norms
among the sustainable development alternatives 347 generated by
complexity theory's superior epistemic method? Perhaps Ruhl
envisions a day when humans will not make any normative
decisions because the algorithmic optimization method will
determine the best choices for each human to make in order to
Id.; see also id. at 46 (stating that "[wihen we map the interrelations and
conflicting constraints of sustainable development's five components, we create
such a fitness landscape"); id. at 54 (noting that "[o]ptimization across a fitness
landscape involves using optimizing search algorithms not only to control for
direction, but also to test the fitness of different system component combinations
and adapt to the results continuously").
343 See supra notes 315-46 and accompanying text.34 See supra note 292.
345 See supra notes 292-314, 339 and accompanying text.346 See supra notes 292-339 and accompanying text.347 See supra notes 339-42 and accompanying text.
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maximize his or her own "fitness landscape."348 The new society
will resemble a Brave New World349 with a significant dose of
Orwellian control. If a human is caught deviating from the
government's algorithmic determination of his "best" fitness
landscape, then he will be summarily incarcerated for "unrea-
sonably" threatening the "public good." His deviant behavior would
potentially harm the rest of the populace willfully complying with
the government's algorithmic "fitness" recommendations.
Ruhl's reformulation of law's potential epistemic scope,
understood as a function of complexity theory, renders obsolete
debate about Mill's "practical question, where to place the
limit-how to make the fitting adjustment between individual
independence and social control."35 °  In the context of
environmental law and regulation, Ruhl develops the prototypical
answer to Mills' quandary through his complex systems ideology
and the function of the optimization algorithm in sustainable
development policy. In the unified law-and-society system,
complexity theory's province expands to include matters
traditionally viewed as non-scientific and essentially normative. If
Ruhl is correct, we are entering a world in which Mill's concerns
about individual liberty are on the brink of revolutionary
resolution. Complexity theory will provide the fundamental
mechanism-an optimization algorithm-necessary to fairly
identify when government is justified in exercising power over
individuals or groups in order to "prevent harm to others,"35 1
" It is important to recall that people are also complex adaptive systems. See
supra note 204 and accompanying text.
349 HUXLEY, supra note 291.
50 Mill, supra note 235, at 130.
351 Id. at 135.
The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as
entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the
individual in the way of compulsion and control, whether the
means used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, or
the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is, that the
sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of
their number, is self protection. That the only purpose for which
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including future generations. Guided by complexity theory's lights,
political authorities are no longer as challenged by what Mill
called "the principal question in human affairs"35 2-what rules of
conduct should be imposed by law and which human behaviors
mark the bounds of legitimate government interference.353
Perhaps "this is not our fate."354 Instead, we should wave
goodbye to all-encompassing, unifying theories once and for all;
their long-term social and political consequences are not
particularly desirable. In fact, the pursuit of such preeminent
theories is quite dangerous, leading to a world governed by those
who control the "superior" knowledge production method and
justify its government-sponsored use as the most effective method
for solving social problems. Platonic Queens and Machiavellian
Princes may not produce good offspring.
D. Conclusion
The epistemological and normative consequences of complexity
theory's application to the unified sociolegal model extend well
beyond the specifics of sustainable development. The law-and-
society system argument presupposes that complexity theory
provides the epistemological foundation necessary to explain law's
change through time, the behavior and structure of law, and the
subjects of environmental regulation.355 The model is premised
upon the unifying principles that will eventually produce the tools
necessary to coherently and accurately assess the fitness landscape
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Id; see also supra Part II.C (discussing sustainable development and
algorithms).
352 Id.
353 Id.
... See Bob Dylan, All Along the Watchtower, on JOHN WESLEY HARDING
(Columbia Records 1967) ("'No reason to get excited,' the thief, he kindly spoke,
'There are many here among us who feel that life is but a joke. But you and I,
we've been through that, and this is not our fate, So let us not talk falsely now,
the hour is getting late.'").
311 See supra Part I.B.
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governing choices for regulatory reinvention; deliberative demo-
cratic processes diminish in importance.
Ruhl's account of law's evolution creates a bifurcated
regulatory world separating the experiential, normative world of
mere appearances and the real world accessed and explained only
with complexity theory. His conceptual drift to a novel worldview
is fueled by the analytical isolation of laws-formal rules-from
the informal constraints, enforcement characteristics and human
organizations3 56 forming the world of environmental regulation.
The theoretical and practical meanings of "law" and "society" are
insufficiently distinct to justify their normative separation in the
sociolegal model. Ruhl's separation of laws from "social mores and
ethics"357 creates an artificial concept of law that subtly destroys
the foundation of the non-physical version of complexity theory.
The practical problems with Ruhl's theory demonstrate that
"theoretical knowing, or cognition, is parasitic upon circum-
spection, or practical know-how."35 Complexity theory will not
produce objective knowledge to adjudicate the value-based conflicts
necessarily characterizing the formation, interpretation, and
implementation of all environmental regulations.3 59 Regulatory
356 See generally NORTH, supra note 226, at 36-60.
351 See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
358 Leiter, supra note 224, at 280. See generally id. at 267-68 (arguing that all-
encompassing theories will never adequately explain "practical know-how," in
part, due to
the sheer magnitude of what is contemplated by asserting the
primacy of theory: One must be able to produce a lexical
ordering of rules describing the whole network of semiautomatic
ways we have of coping with everyday events and things. ...
The complexity is staggering; but what is worse is that it is not
apparent that we could ever fully capture in theoretical form
what we do with practical ease .... At some point . . . "in-
principle" reductions become suspect when they have no
successful instantiations. Show us a theoretical reduction of
practical know-how to explicit rules, the Heideggerian might
say, and then we will take the challenge seriously.).
359 See RORTY, supra note 1, at 163 (criticizing the foundationalist view that the
way to know more about the objects of our beliefs is to find within "the activity
of a quasi-visual faculty, The Mirror of Nature ... a special privileged class of
representations so compelling that their accuracy cannot be doubted").
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change, which must include changes in agency culture, should be
pursued without attempting to incorporate the illusory certainty
Ruhl seeks through a unifying theory (and its algorithms). Human
beings are responsible for designing and implementing poli-
cies-imperfection and uncertainty are necessary features of the
process. Regulatory coherence and consistency-admirable goals
never to be fully realized-should be pursued with a context-
specific approach that recognizes the importance of human
deliberation, responsibility, and democracy. 6 °
III. ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY REFORM SANS COMPLEXITY
THEORY
The answer to the defects of democracy is not denial
of the democratic idea.... We shall equally avoid
blind attachment and romantic impatience only if we
recognize the essentially provisional nature of all
political arrangements. Such an attitude will treat
government not only as a mechanism for day-to-day
adjustments but also as an hypothesis in action, to be
modified by the experience which it adduces.36 1
Defining the problem with environmental regulation as a func-
tion of a poorly structured and maladapted regulatory whole dis-
torts the relative influence of particular laws and specific agency
practices on regulatory problems. Environmental regulatory
360 Id. at 348-49 (providing the following advice to "defenders of hermeneutics"
engaging in philosophical argument with "defenders of 'unified science:'"
[The] defenders of hermeneutics should just say that, as a
matter of brute fact rather than of metaphysical necessity, there
is no such thing as the "language of unified science." We have
not got a language which will serve as a permanent neutral
matrix for formulating all good explanatory hypotheses, and we
have not the foggiest notion of how to get one. (This is
compatible with saying that we do have a neutral, if unhelpful,
observation language.) So epistemology-as the attempt to
render all discourses commensurable by translating them into
a preferred set of terms-is unlikely to be a useful strategy.).
361 FRANKFURTER, supra note 30, at 128-29.
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reform analysis requires the differentiation of particular
statutes-or groups of statutes-from the regulatory whole.
Context-specific assessment strategies are necessary to identify
potential targets for statutory reform and agency reorganization.
The contextual approach necessarily attends to the issues at the
heart of particular environmental conflicts by investigating the
kinds of problems and the kinds of substantive knowledge affecting
a subset of the regulatory whole.
Constitutional and democratic principles, not complexity
theory's unifying foundation, should provide the justification for
environmental regulatory reform. Fortunately, Ruhl provides
several laudable reform proposals that may be detached from their
complexity theory roots.362 Although his purported justification is
to combat the evils of reductionism with a complex system
response, the proposals owe their virtues to constitutional origins.
Unencumbered by the gravity of a unifying theory, Ruhl's
proposals serve as starting points for future work and research
directed toward improving environmental law and regulation. This
Article supplements his suggestions with a few thoughts
emphasizing the substantive knowledge necessary for agency
reorganization, statutory and regulatory change, and future
environmental regulatory decisions.
A. Ruhl's Proposals for Environmental Regulatory Reform
Ruhl proposes three fundamental structural adjustments to
the environmental regulatory system "to reverse the reductionist
funnel that has produced our regulatory state."363 The goal is to
optimize system sustainability with a unified approach to
regulatory reform justified by complexity theory principles.36 The
362 See infra Part III.A.
363 Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 917.
.64 Id. at 917 (arguing that the "the entire package could produce a redirection
away from the regulations attractor toward a more balanced orbit around
freedoms, rights, and regulations spheres. The aim is to return us to a
sufficiently coupled system ... to promote maximal system adaptability."); see
also id. at 917-18 (acknowledging that "each of these proposals has been made
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plan is based upon "three interlocking components."3 6' Ruhl
suggests that "common law, rights-based solutions"3 66 should be
the primary means for governing the exercise of freedoms.
Congress should also participate directly in more substantive
decision-making processes bearing upon regulatory issues;
agencies would serve as "Congress's research and monitoring
arm."3 67 Finally, Congress and the judiciary should become less
deferential and sharply curtail agency discretion.368
The first proposal suggests common law principles should play
an important role at all levels of regulatory reform. Ruhl
translates the Legal Realists' "vision [for the common law] into the
lexicon of dynamical systems theory"369 to produce the best
available mechanism for enhancing system adaptability.37 ° The
common law offers "system structure and process" advantages over
other rigid alternatives. 371 The common law changes slowly and
incrementally,372 decides conflicts "whole and decides them in their
context,"37 3 and functions at less abstract levels than agency
decision-making processes.374
in some form elsewhere in the literature, [but] none has been made for the
reasons I offer, and the three rarely appear as the unified package [that] I
propose is necessary to reverse course").
365 Id. at 917.
366 Id. at 917-20; Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1487.
367 Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 917, 921.
368 See id. at 917, 923-26.
369 Id. at 918.
1
70 See id. (arguing that "the rights-based attractor of our law-and-society system
is adaptive, and the common law is the best approach for keeping us there").
371 See id. at 920.
372 See id. at 919.
373 See Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 919.
374 See id. at 919-20. Ruhl argues that
the common law operates at the component interaction level,
whereas the administrative state functions on the upper surface,
taking on the problems the lower levels' interactions toss up like
ping pong balls.... The common law thus is more likely to "see
the component interactions before the administrative state does
and to adapt to them more efficiently."
Id.; see also Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1472 (contending that the
common law "through its system of patched jurisdictions and various loose and
strong couplings . . .offers reasonable expectations of evolving towards the
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Ruhl also proposes reinvigorating the nondelegation doctrine
and requiring congressional action on critical environmental
regulatory issues.375 Agency responsibilities would be limited to
day-to-day operations of government, providing Congress with
assistance upon request.3 6 Reinforcing the nondelegation doctrine
promotes system adaptability because Congress "is more
dynamically in tune with the law-and-society system than one can
imagine any modern agency being."
377
However, Ruhl's proposal to enhance congressional activities
in environmental affairs is contingent upon the implementation of
several congressional reform measures.378 Congress should enact
effective laws prohibiting campaign financing by special
interests. 79 Congressional reform should also address "committee
structure, term limits, third party access, and the like.., if we
expect Congress to take back some of the responsibilities it has
frittered away to agencies and exercise them adaptively."
3 1
Ruhl argues that the "new-look" Congress should substan-
tially enhance judicial review of administrative discretion.3
Congress should reverse the Chevron382 and Chadha313 doctrines
region of [optimal] complexity-to the edge of chaos"); id. at 1487 (arguing that
"greater reliance on common law mechanisms of lawmaking" will promote
system sustainability).
371 See Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 920-22.
376 Id.
377 Id. at 922.
378 Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1487.
379 Id.
3 80 Id.
3 11 See Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 923-26.
382 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Nat' Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see
also Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 925 (arguing that
"Chevron creates an anti-majoritarian force within agencies and allows them to
move policy away from the actual policy intended by Congress"); Ruhl, The
Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1487.
383 Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); see
also Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 925-26 (arguing
that "reversing the Chadha doctrine's prohibition of the legislative veto
mechanism would allow Congress to police agency action more directly and
thereby take advantage of its superior dynamical responsiveness"); Ruhl, The
Fitness of Law, supra note 2, at 1487.
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that unreasonably increase environmental regulatory agencies'
decision-making authority. Reversing Chevron and Chadha would
force Congress to make legislative decisions explicit, reduce agency
power to legislate, and increase agency accountability to the people
through their elected representatives." 4 Congress should also
adopt less restrictive standards of judicial review for agency
decisions than the Administrative Procedure Act's "arbitrary and
capricious" and "substantial evidence" standards." 5 Ruhl urges
Congress to shift the evidentiary burden of proof and require
agencies to justify their discretionary decisions by a preponderance
of the evidence or a similar standard.8 6
B. Environmental Regulatory Reform Unburdened by Complexity
Theory
Separated from the normative and epistemological burdens of
the unifying theory, Ruhl's proposals 38 7 are easily justified on
democratic and constitutional grounds-he provides the evidence
and basic arguments connecting the proposals to the Constitution.
Moreover, the nature of the proposals warrants incremental
implementation 3"8 rather than across-the-board change encouraged
by unifying theories. The separation of powers doctrine provides a
basic constitutional justification for Ruhl's proposals. The purpose
311 See Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 924-26.
385 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E) (2000) (requiring that courts limit substantive
review of agency action to determining whether the agency's decision was
"arbitrary [or] capricious" or "unsupported by substantial evidence").
386 Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 2, at 923.
387 See supra notes 366-68 and accompanying text.
388 See NORTH, supra note 226, at 89 (arguing that "the single most important
point about institutional change, which must be grasped.., is that institutional
change is overwhelmingly incremental"). See generally Cynthia R. Farina, The
Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Complex World, 72 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 987, 1036-37 (1997) (arguing for an implementation of the
"Founders"' tools, "theory, practical wisdom, and conscious experimentation" to
seek solutions to the problems of the regulatory state; society should not set its
sights on "a single legitimating savior, [but instead, pursue a process] of
incremental experimentation and improvement in the multitude of 'ordinary'
political and administrative processes and structures").
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of this Article is only to highlight the proposals' plausibility as
justifiable on constitutional and democratic grounds, not to argue
the position in detail.
Agencies' excessive political power infringes upon the
constitutional authority and responsibilities of the congressional
and judicial branches." 9 Agencies are sometimes beholden to
special interest groups39 ° and they often act without reasonable
political accountability.39 ' The agencies write the regulations
interpreting federal statutes and governing their own regulatory
responsibilities; "it is not good that he who makes the law should
administer it."392 Congress rarely evaluates the agencies'
implementation of statutory goals through agency regulations.
Environmental regulatory agencies have morphed into powerful
political entities that slipped under the Constitution's radar.
James Madison's democratically motivated cautions about
"factions"393 and "self-interested"394 governance provide a philo-
sophical vantage point from which to re-examine agency decision-
making processes.395 In The Federalist No. 10, Madison noted that
the range and scope of factional influence, and its degree of harm
to democratic society, fluctuates "according to the different
389 See supra notes 140-42, 375-86 and accompanying text.
390 Id.
391 Id.
392 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT in SIR ERNEST BARKER,
SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY JOHN LOCKE, DAVID HUME AND JEAN-JACQUES
ROUSSEAU 231 (Oxford University Press 1960) (1762); THE FEDERALIST No. 10,
at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). "No man is allowed to be a
judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment,
and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason,
a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time." Id.
313 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 392, at 78-79 (asserting that
by a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether
amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are
united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of
interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community).
394 SUNSTEIN, supra note 16, at 16.
311 See, e.g., Ruhl & Salzman, Red Queen, supra note 2, at 761 n.11 (quoting
Richard B. Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 335, 342 (1990)).
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circumstances of civil society."396 He argued that a republican form
of government provides greater protection to the Constitution than
a pure democracy by reducing the impact of factions and the
likelihood of officials acting in their self-interest. 397 Repre-
sentatives are drawn from a sufficiently large group of citizens
over a sufficiently large geographic area "to guard against the
cabals of a few."398 Madison contended that the constitutional
design produced a national government and state governments
that counteracted factional influence and fairly apportioned
responsibility for the public good.
Ruhl draws attention to Congress's failure to oversee the
promulgation of agency regulations to ensure the protection of
democratic principles and statutory purposes. 3 9 Ruhl's argument
for increased congressional action over core subjects of
environmental regulation parallels some of Madison's concerns
about "factions." Regulatory agencies exercise broad political
power over issues directly affecting the public good without
sufficient levels of practical accountability to citizens' elected
representatives.4 "' Congressional inaction betrays the public trust
and contravenes its constitutional responsibility to reasonably
uphold the separation of powers doctrine.
For several decades, agency expertise has been mistakenly
justified by the reductionist philosophy Ruhl slays quite well.4 '
The expertise label arguably imbues agencies with excessive power
over natural resource decisions. °2 Agencies often act as epistemic
396 THE FEDERALIST, supra note 392, at 79; cf. SIR THOMAS MOORE, UTOPIA
(Robert M. Adams trans. & ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1975) (1516) (stating that
"[w] herever they take root in men's minds, these two evils, greed and faction, are
the destruction of all justice-and justice is the strongest bond of any society").
397 See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 392.
398 Id. at 82.
399 See supra note 375.
400 See Ruhl & Salzmann, Red Queen, supra note 2, at 761 (arguing that
regulatory agencies are motivated to promulgate new rules favoring special
interest groups).
401 See supra notes 37-45, 94-129 and accompanying text.
402 See Freedman, supra note 259, at 369-74 (arguing that in 1976 the public
attitude toward agencies was one of increasing skepticism. Freedman suggested
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governors, a far cry from Ruhl's suggestion that they should
conduct "research and monitoring"40 3 functions as Congress's
agents. Environmental regulatory agencies' authority undermines
the democratic process of producing and evaluating knowledge
claims relevant to policy decisions. Agencies' decision-making
power has simply outgrown its constitutional and democratic
justifications.
Ruhl's proposal to shift the burden of proof to agencies is
also justified by the separation of powers doctrine.4 °4 Until
Congress proscribes agency authority, the judiciary should incor-
porate Ruhi's "common law" proposal 4°5 and aggressively hold
environmental agencies' accountable for their substantive
decisions.4 °6 Responsible adjudication entails cognitive and
normative functions. The contextual nature ofjudicial proceedings
provides ample opportunity for the judiciary to compel increases in
the level of transparency and accountability characterizing
agencies' decision-making processes.
Freed from complexity theory's illusory foundation, Ruhl's
proposals40 7 provide reasonable starting points for environmental
regulatory reform. But Ruhl also notes that reform measures will
fail in the absence of greater attention to the acquisition and
the following reasons for increased skepticism: "Traditional distrust of experts,"
"[albsence of genuine 'expertise,'" and "[ilnadequacy of expertise to resolve
questions of public policy Congress delegated to agencies.").
403 See supra note 367 and accompanying text.
4o4 See supra notes 381-86 accompanying text.
411 See supra notes 370-74 and accompanying text.
406 See supra notes 381-86; see generally Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining
Marbury in the Administrative State, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1239, 1337 (2002). Molot
defends
judicial power based on the judiciary's structural role and
institutional attributes. As the lone constitutional actor without
a formal role in legislation or law execution, the judiciary is
uniquely situated to place needed limits on government
administration and to ensure that political officials comply with
the constitutionally prescribed lawmaking procedures and the
constitutional separation of powers.
Id.
407 See supra Part III.A.
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assimilation of knowledge.4"' He emphasizes the importance of
developing interdisciplinary knowledge that bridges the gaps
among claims produced by ecologists, economists, sociologists, and
other relevant fields.40 9
Ruhl also identifies the unfairness characterizing mainstream
methods for cost-benefit and risk-analysis. 410 His cautions point to
the critical democratic problem with economic analyses relied upon
by special interests-or by agencies themselves-to justify
regulatory decisions. Mainstream economic analyses governing
environmental regulatory decisions erroneously assume that
natural resources are "boundless."41' Traditional views of the
"environment as a subsystem of the economy"4"2 should be
replaced--or at least complimented-with an economics founded
on the principle that the "human economy is a subsystem of the
408 Ruhl, Sustainable Development, supra note 2, at 58-63.
409 See, e.g., id. at 57-62.
410 See Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of Law, supra note 2, at 479-80 (contending
that cost-benefit analysis of regulatory proposals should be avoided because it
may enhance social inequity); Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra
note 2, at 914-16 (arguing that "risk-benefit" analysis is a misguided reductivist
idea).
411 Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 675,678
(2003) (arguing that
environmental law does not suffer from a lack of well-designed,
well-studied policy tools to achieve its goals, but rather from a
lack of urgency among policymakers and the public concerning
the necessity to achieve those goals. Such urgency simply does
not follow from a preanalytic [economic] worldview in which
nature is assumed to be boundless.).
4 12 Id. at 728; see also id. at 676-77 (arguing that
because mainstream economic accounts generally fail to
recognize absolute limits imposed by nature on the ability of
humans to appropriate and utilize natural resources, they also
fail to provide an adequate conceptual basis on which to make
the political judgments required by tradable permit schemes.
Just as cost-benefit analysis seems incoherent under the moral
absolutism of 1970s-era environmental statutes, setting
aggregate limits to annual sulfur dioxide emissions appears
nonsensical, or at least not urgent, within a theoretical model
that recognizes no ultimate constraints to economic growth.)
(citation omitted).
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environment."413 Environmental regulatory reform should include
re-examining mainstream economic assumptions that obstruct
well-informed natural resource policy decisions. Douglas Kysar
appropriately suggests that the "famous Lockean proviso that
private ownership of resource use is collectively maximiz[ed] only
so long as 'there is enough, and as good left in common for others'
arguably has become an issue of actual, rather than mere
philosophical, concern."4 14
Congress should re-enter the natural resources game and
sufficiently fund comprehensive research about the environment's
ecological conditions to explore the very challenging task of
developing context-specific, environmental "baselines."4 15 This is a
long-term proposition carrying considerable conceptual and
practical challenges. Oliver Houck summarizes the normative and
epistemic issues precluding a simple solution to the problem of
designing environmental laws and regulations to produce the best
knowledge for policymakers.
Specificity, then, becomes the greatest challenge to
any law seeking to protect biological diversity and
ecosystems. On one level, it is a question of wrestling
potentially limitless questions of scale, time, base-
lines, and scientific complexity to the ground. On
another level, it is a question of standards sufficient
to wrestle the most powerful economic forces in the
country, if not to the ground, to something closer to a
draw.
416
If Congress follows Ruhl's regulatory reform proposals and
funds policies to increase the knowledge reservoir and level of
detail about ecological phenomena, we should witness the
413 Id. at 728.
414 Id. at 698.
415 See id. at 717-27 (advocating adopting "natural resource depletion quotas" to
help address population and consumption levels).
416 Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management; 81
MINN. L. REV. 869, 883 (1997).
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invention and application of new technologies for environmental
applications-in the field and in the lab. Agencies will emphasize
research over administration as they transform into Congress's
"research and monitoring arm."417 The environmental regulatory
system will develop through new institutional arrangements
placing a premium on knowledge and reducing agency respon-
sibility for critical environmental policy decisions.
Agency organizations should be redesigned to facilitate
integration of agency and non-agency information networks to
improve access to information bearing upon environmental
regulation and policy. The design and construction of compre-
hensive information networks may yield an opportunity for Ruhl's
complex adaptive systems philosophy to impact regulatory
practices.41 The physical network systems should be structured to
optimize the acquisition, productive integration, and targeted
dissemination of ecological, economic, and social knowledge to
relevant agencies and organizations (including universities).
Congress should authorize the development of an environmental
regulatory information network consistent with government's
responsibility to responsibly decide natural resource issues.
C. Conclusion
Environmental regulatory agencies' organizational structures
should be superseded by more adaptive, less centralized, and far
more politically accountable organizations dedicated to research
and monitoring. Ruhl's proposals (sans complexity theory) serve as
an important starting point for reforming the environmental
regulatory system. The justifications for change should emanate
from the democratic principles that fueled the formation of the
Constitution; we should democratically identify and discuss
417 See supra note 367.
418 See Ruhl, Sustainable Development, supra note 2, at 62-63 (discussing the
"[President's Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology call] for 'next
generation' National Biological Information Infrastructure to create a 'fully-
digitally accessible, distributed, interactive research library system'" ) (citation
omitted).
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regulatory alternatives without appealing to "unifying" principles
from complexity theory. Douglass North's "general points" should
serve as important reminders on the path to an improved
environmental regulatory apparatus. First, "the institutional
framework will shape the direction of the acquisition of knowledge
and skills."4'9 Second, "that direction will be the decisive factor for
the long-run development of society."42 ° The institutional
framework will develop and evolve only if Congress and the
judiciary emphasize the need for freshly ordained agencies that
serve the people as researchers and monitors, rather than as
judges and legislators.
CONCLUSION: COMPLEXITY THEORY'S LAW-AND-SOCIETY
SYSTEM-"CONCEPTUAL REDUCTIONISM"?
Well-intentioned efforts to develop unifying theoretical
foundations for environmental regulatory reform are destined to
fail. Holling, Gunderson, and Ludwig's straightforward
confessions42 1 provide rare insight into the human fascination with
discovering a solution to all unanswered questions. Perhaps only
great minds have the capacity to challenge the world's disparate
and often inexplicable phenomena with "unifying" theories.
Unfortunately, this approach leads to the "pitfall of overstretched
generality"4 22 and necessary retreat to humble positions honoring
human limitations. Retreat in this instance need not signal defeat.
The goal to improve the human condition through the design of a
just environmental regulatory system is actually furthered by such
noble, but ill-fated, efforts. We benefit even in the absence of a
unifying theory that explains phenomena in the environmental
regulatory system. Our responsibility now is to direct our attention
to incremental, context-specific strategies designed to usher in a
renaissance of environmental law. Contextual strategies have the
potential to induce changes in public consciousness and promote
419 NORTH, supra note 226, at 78.
420 Id.
421 See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
422 See supra note 155.
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regulatory reform. A renaissance in environmental law and policy
will begin with seemingly insignificant, small victories motivated
by fundamental democratic principles.
Complexity theory served a useful purpose, but it is time to
stop diverting time and energy to the dream of a "unifying" theory.
Complexity theory will never succeed where all others have
failed-attempting to reduce norms to facts, rules to genera-
lizations, and justifications to explanations.423 In the context of the
sociolegal system, complexity theory may survive the charge of
"substance-based" reductionism, but "conceptual reductionism?"
That's another story.
423 RORTY, supra note 1, at 180; see also supra note 145.
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